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THE FTC'S PRESERVATION OF CONSUMERS'
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES: CONSUMER
SECURITY OR CONSUMER FRAUD?
INTRODUCTION

Growing concern for consumer protection, partially the consequence of gross injustice toward the consumer evident in the common
law and partially the result of strong consumer lobbies, has spawned
dynamic legal developments.' Federal, state and local legislative
bodies have all become active in the movement to protect the consumer. State legislatures have provided for easier consumer access to
the courts;2 local officials have attempted to enforce ordinances
designed to prevent consumer injuries.3 On the federal level this drive
has instigated attempts to create a federal consumer agency. 4 While
such an agency has never materialized, Congress has opted to expend
the powers of the Federal Trade Commission in the hope that the FTC
could assume the role of chief consumer protection agency in the
United States. 5 This note examines the scope and effect of a recent
FTC regulation-"Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses" 6-which represents the latest attempt to introduce consumer protection into the modern credit process.
Consumerism is of rather recent vintage. For centuries the
interests of the investor-merchant had been paramount in the legal
and commercial decision-making processes of society. These merchant interests spurred development of the concept of negotiability in
English law in order to increase the money supply within the
economy and create for the holder of notes and contracts a means of
1. See, e.g., Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.); Truth-in-Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1968); Model Consumer Credit Act (proposed by the
National Consumer Law Center). The development of strict products liability theory
has also worked for consumers' benefit. See RESTATEMENT, (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A;
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972 Official Text) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTIVITIES OF STATE GOVERNMENTS (Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1963): COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES (1970).
3.

L. GORDON & S. LEE, ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 651 (1972); Staff

Studies Prepared for the National Institute for Consumer Justice on Federal
Regulatory Agencies 60 (1972).
4. Hearings on S.R. 707 and S.R. 1160 Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research and Int'l Organizationof the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations,93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
5. The result of this was the FTC Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4157 (1975). See 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702 (1974).
6. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975). See note 16 infra.
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obtaining immediate capital. 7 These same interests also developed
the notion of a holder in due course (HDC), which insured the ready
negotiability of notes and contracts. Since their inception in the
eighteenth century, the concepts of negotiability and the preferred
holder have become firmly entrenched in our legal heritage.8
While negotiability was originally a tool used primarily among
merchants, today it directly affects millions of consumers. Merchants
no longer do the bulk of credit buying; it is the consumer who has
totally adopted the credit purchase and in so doing has been faced
with the likelihood of having his credit contract or promissory note
negotiated or assigned. In the past few decades the volume of
consumer credit buying has more than doubled.9 Credit buying has
so permeated every aspect of consumer sales that it may be on the
way toward replacing cash as the principle value mechanism. 0
Negotiability and the HDC status are useful tools when
employed in an all-merchant transaction; but when used in a
consumer transaction, they create great potential for injury to the
consumer-a potential which in the past has often been realized." An
illustrative case highlights the dangers and problems facing the
consumer when his notes or contracts are assigned.
7. Negotiability is the ability to transfer the right to receive payment on a
promissory note to a subsequent holder. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of
Consumer Paper, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Littlefield, Good
Faith Purchase]; Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375
(1971). The primary benefits of negotiability are that it creates immediate capital for
the negotiator, increases the overall money flow, and increases the incidence of credit
buying.
8. The first judicial recognition of negotiability was made in Race v. Miller,
97 Eng. Rep. 398, 402 (K.B. 1758). See Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 378. Most merchantcreditors believed that a note would be useless unless some promise could be made by
which payment could be guaranteed to a transferee. When only a consumer credit
contract is used the same result can be achieved by use of a waiver of defenses clause.
See U.C.C. § 9-206.
9. Figures indicate that in 1976 there was well over $190 billion in
outstanding consumer credit, marking an increase from $90 billion in 1965. 58 FED.
RES. BULL, 961 (Oct. 1972); B. CURRAIN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 814 (1965). These figures represent amounts of credit outstanding at the end of the year.
61 FED. RES. BULL. A-45 (Dec. 1975). For an explanation of these figures, see 58 FED.
RES. BULL. 961 (Oct. 1972). See also Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses:
Plugging the Loopholes in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272, 293 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses].
10. I. FISHER, PURCHASING POWER OF MONEY 79 (1927); L. MANDELL, CREDIT
CARD USE IN THE UNITED STATES 94-104 (1972).
11. For examples of consumer injury see 40 Fed. Reg. 53506 (1975), and W.
MAGNUSON, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKET PLACE 9-33 (1972).
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In response to an advertisement in a local newspaper, residents
signed up to begin classes in an electronics school. Upon enrollment
each student signed a tuition installment contract for $2000. The
contract contained a waiver of defenses clause which abrogated any
right in the signer to assert a defense against a subsequent holder of
the contract. Like most schools, this one required immediate cash to
maintain its operation. Thus, to negotiate the contracts for the
maximum amount, the school had to include such a waiver. The
school later assigned the contracts to a financier. Because the
financier purchased the contracts for value, in good faith, and
without notice of a defense to payment, he held the contract with all
the rights of a holder in due course.' 2 Unfortunately the school went
bankrupt.
When the students arrived for classes they were
confronted with an empty building and a creditor who had a perfect
legal right to receive $2000 from each. Since the school was
judgment-proof, the students had no meaningful recourse against it
and were bound by the contract and waiver clause to pay the full
tuition price. 13
This example, repeated in innumerable variations, illustrates at
least two points. First, there is a conflict of interest between the
seller (school) who desires, quite properly, to get the most cash for
assigned contracts and notes, and the consumer who hazards paying
without getting any benefits. Secondly, this example highlights the
potential dangers which negotiability and the HDC status present to
the consumer. 14 These dangers are realized when the duty of the
seller to perform is separated from the consumer's duty to pay. The
separation is effected in a way which cuts off the consumer's right to
assert defenses against the financier-holder. The consumer becomes
liable to a third party without immediate recourse to the seller to
enforce the contract. Another danger created by negotiability and
the HDC status is that the seller may become bankrupt or may
disappear, leaving the consumer without any recourse.' 5 For these
12. The requirements for holder in due course status (HDC) are found in
U.C.C. § 3-302. Since the holder here has a contract and not a negotiable instrument,
U.C.C. § 9-206 would apply, giving the holder of the contract with waivers all the
rights of an HDC. See Note, The Status of UCC § 9-206-The Waiver of Defense Clause,
31 U. PITT. L. REV. 687 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Status of UCC § 9-2061.
13. A similar case was reported to the FTC during its hearings on the
proposed Seller Rule. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53515 (1975).
14. "HCD status" is used here to mean any situations in which the seller and
creditor may successfully cut off the consumer's defenses. See note 11 supra.
15. It is generally not worth the effort or expense for a consumer to attempt to
find a seller who has suddenly disappeared. Even the best small claims court procedure
cannot help when the defendant seller is not amenable to service of process.
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reasons, consumer protection measures have concentrated on limiting the seller's ability to cut off consumers' defenses by transfer of the
sales note or contract.
The latest, and to date the most sweeping, step in the battle to
preserve consumers' defenses has come in the form of a regulation
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission. This regulation,
which became effective in May of 1976, is entitled "Preservation of
Consumers' Claims and Defenses."' 16 The regulation prevents the
seller from cutting off a consumer's right to assert defenses to
payment for goods and services against that party whom the
consumer-debtor must pay.
Negotiability is not forbidden in
consumer credit transactions by this "Seller Rule," but the Rule does
purport to deny HDC status or the rights thereof to certain
transferees of consumer credit instruments and to certain related
creditors.
The Seller Rule itself is deceptively clear and straightforward.
Its brief text reads:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to
consumers, in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is
defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is an
unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of
Section 5 of that Act for a seller, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to
contain the following provision in at least ten point, bold
face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT

To ALL CLAIMS

AND DEFENSES

WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF.
RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
16.

16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975). This regulation was first proposed by the FTC in

1971, 35 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971); it was altered and proposed again in 1973, 38 Fed. Reg.
892 (1973); in its final form it was issued in 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506 (1975). The Seller
Rule was adopted according to the prescribed procedures which require the FTC to
hold public hearings on the proposal.. Promulgation must be published in the Federal
Register and accompanied with a statement of basis and purpose. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.7 et
seq. (1975).
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or, (b) Accept as full or partial payment for such sale or
lease, the proceeds of any purchase money loan (as
purchase money loan is defined herein), unless any consumer credit contract made in connection with such
purchase money loan contains the following provision in at
least ten point, bold face, type:

NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT To ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER
BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS
17
PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.

The Federal Trade Commission's Seller Rule brings a long
needed protection to the consumer as debtor. Its preservation of

defenses in the interlocking loan transaction is of particular merit.
Although a significant improvement from earlier attempts to
preserve the consumer's claims and defenses, it poses some new
problems as well. Not the least of these problems is the inability of the

FTC to enforce the Seller Rule adequately. The FTC structure and
resources are not geared for enforcement of such a pervasive rule,

affecting as it does millions of transactions. The consumer injured by
a violation of the Seller Rule does, however, have several possible
alternatives to enforcement through normal FTC procedures. Should

the Seller Rule be amended as proposed,18 implication of a private

cause of action would offer the consumer a direct remedy. Even
without that amendment, the consumer may still have a viable
remedy through the good faith requirements of the U.C.C. 19
17. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975). A consumer credit contract is defined: "Any
instrument which evidences or embodies a debt arising from a 'Purchase Money Loan'
transaction or a 'financed sale' as defined in [this section]." 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(g) (1975).
A purchase money loan is defined:
A cash advance which is received by a consumer in return for a "Finance
Charge" within the meaning of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation
Z, which is applied, in whole or substantial part, to a purchase of goods or
services from a seller who (1) refers consumers to the creditor or (2) is
affiliated with the creditor by common control, contract, or business
arrangement.
16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1975).
18. See note 130 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 209-21 infra and accompanying text.
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STATUS AS PROBLEMS FOR THE CONSUMER

In many cases where the consumer is injured, as in the
illustrative case above, his defenses are cut off by negotiation to an
HDC in the furtherance of some clandestine purpose of the seller.
Such bilkings are possible because in many states the law permits
separation 20 of the transactional duties. 21 Separation occurs when the
seller's duty to abide by the contract is separated from the consumer's
duty to pay the loaii required to buy those goods or services. The
consumer's defenses are entirely cut off when separation includes a
waiver of defenses by the consumer or involves a promissory note
transferred to an HDC. There are five types of sales transactions in
which separation of duties can act to cut off consumers' defenses:
1. The seller may force the consumer to sign a promissory
note in addition to the sales contract, later discounting the
note to another holder.
2. The seller may include in the terms of the sales
contract a waiver of defenses against subsequent holders
and then assign the contract. This method was used in the
illustration above.
3. The seller may refer the consumer to a creditor with
whom the seller is related and have the consumer arrange
for a loan with which to make the purchase.
4. The seller may leave the consumer to arrange his loan
independently.
5. The seller may accept payment on the card of a third22
party credit card company.
In each of these situations the seller increases the value of the
consumer credit contract or note and insulates himself and the holder
of the note or contract from the consumer, who would stop payment in
response to breach by the seller. Although it is advantageous to the
seller and creditor, separation generally works a burden on the
consumer.
In every situation in which the seller successfully separates the
transactional duties to cut off defenses, the consumer retains the legal
20. In this analysis, "separation" will be used to refer to the separation of the
duty of the consumer-debtor to pay for goods or services from the duty of the seller to
provide those goods or services.
21. "Transactional duties" are the corresponding duties of the consumer to
pay and the seller to produce.
22. These five were recognized and described by the FTC in hearings held
prior to promulgation of the Seller Rule. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506 (1975).
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right to bring suit against the seller directly when a breach occurs. 23
However, separation denies the consumer the simplest and most
reasonable remedy-non-payment. 24 Unlike the costly and timeconsuming process of litigation, non-payment has the benefit of being
readily employable, placing the burden of litigation on the creditor or
seller. In many cases it would be economically impracticable for the
consumer to seek legal redress, since the cost of the seller's breach is
less than the cost of litigation. Thus when separation of duties cuts off
defenses, the consumer will often absorb the loss rather than chance a
costly suit.25 Even assuming that the consumer were in an economic
position to litigate, if the seller could not be found, or were beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, or were judgment-proof, the consumer
would remain essentially without recourse. 26 Separation, therefore,
burdens the consumer in three ways when the seller breaches: first,
the consumer is forced to litigate instead of simply refusing to pay;
second, separation makes it too expensive for the consumer to remedy
many seller breaches; and third, the consumer faces a total loss if the
seller is inaccessible to direct suit.
Recent developments in other areas of the law, primarily
procedural in nature, have helped reduce the potential for harm to
the consumer. Many states have organized small claims courts to
handle minor claims, generally those involving sums less than
$3000.27 Other states have given their courts leeway to develop new
23. See, e.g., Smith v. Regina Mfg. Corp., 396 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1968);
Universal Major Elec. Appliances v. Glenwood Range Co., 223 F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1955).
24. Non-payment has been considered reasonable or possible in the limited
situation where the only parties involved are the seller and the consumer. If the
consumer were to stop payment to a creditor, his first concern may be his credit rating.
The Seller Rule, however, is an attempt to permit the refusal without causing
repercussions for the consumer. As this right of non-payment becomes part of the
contract it should not be used against the consumer. If a poor credit rating is
threatened by the creditor, the FTC suggests a direct suit against the creditor to clear
up the rating. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
25. This same problem faces the consumer where the item purchased costs
just enough to justify credit buying but not enough to justify filing suit to retrieve the
loss. These cases, of course, rarely find their way into court, but many such examples
have been recorded. See 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53509-12 (1975); W. MAGNUSON, THE
DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 9-33 (1972); Cook v. Lilly, 208 S.E.2d 784, 787 (W.
Va. 1974).
26. The freezer meat industry has been particularly known for disappearing
after making credit sales. See 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53511 (1975). Even the worst record
should not detract from the fact that most sellers are reputable and if alerted to a
breach would remedy the situation without the coercion of litigation. Rosenthal, supra
note 6: Miller, An Alternative Response to the Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the
UCCC, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 438, 443 (1971).
27. D. GOULD, STAFF STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
CONSUMER JUSTICE ON SMALL CLAIMS COURTS (1972).
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concepts in consumer arbitration.28 In federal tribunals, allowing
recovery of attorneys' fees and expanding the scope of consumer class
actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) have also
helped alleviate the pressure on the consumer.2 The primary benefit
of these developments is that they have made it easier and cheaper for
the consumer to assert his claims against the seller. Such remedies,
however, are of no avail if the seller is bankrupt or has absconded.
Further, they generally either require the consumer to exert some
financial effort over and above simple refusal to pay, or they are
limited to losses of minor amounts.
In recognition of the present inadequacies of these remedies and
the need for a direct substantive remedy, attempts have been made to
alleviate the detrimental impact of separating the transactional
duties in consumer transactions for the purposes of cutting off claims
and defenses. Most of these attempts have tried to reunite the duties
of seller and consumer. Forty states have passed legislation relating
to the consumer's duty to pay in response to seller breach,30 while
various state courts have made advances in mitigating the effect of
separation by developing novel interpretations of existing law. 31 The
28. For example, a Michigan statute gives the local judge the option of
developing his own method for consumer redress:
The judge of such court may by rule provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a conciliation division of the court for the purpose of
adjusting, in an informal manner, controversies submitted to it involving
$300.00 or less, and the judges of such court shall, upon the establishment
of such conciliation division adopt rules governing the submission of
controversies to such conciliation division and the practice and procedure
to be followed therein.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 728.18 (1969).
29. Note, Allowance of Attorney Fees in Civil Rights Action, 7 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 381 (1971); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20
VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967).
30. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53521 (1975). The most complete consumer legislation
has been passed in Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin. Other states operating
under less extensive laws preserving consumers' claims and defenses include
Connecticut, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, New Mexico, Maryland and California. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.1 (West 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83; § 147 (1957); MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 225, § 12c (Michie/Law Co-op 1966); Littlefield, The ContinuingDemise
of the HDC Concept, 79 COMM. L.J. 41, 46 (1974); Skilton & Helstead, Protectionof the
Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV.
1465, 1465-68 (1967).
31. Any judicial remedy to separation has been limited because the courts are
bound by the clear meaning of the U.C.C. Yet some courts have sought a limited
remedy. There have been a few areas of encroachment by state courts in which the
HDC status of holders of consumer notes and contracts has been limited. The most
prevalent has been the "proximity rule" or "close-connectedness doctrine."
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general tenor of these laws and decisions, however, has been less than
adequate.3 2
Uniform national laws which have been adopted by some states
have also begun to reflect the change in emphasis toward consumer
credit protection. In nearly all states the basis of commercial law is
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).3 The U.C.C., however, both
sanctions the use of the HDC status in consumer transactions and
gives authority to the use of waivers of defenses in consumer
contracts.4 The more recently proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
This rule states that where the assignor and assignee are sufficiently close
the court will hold the assignee to have had notice of any defense of the consumer, or to
be so closely related that the exchange of the instrument will not be considered a
transfer. International Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172
(1965); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good FaithPurchase,63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1097-1100 (1954); Marinelli, Negotiable Instruments and the Holder in Due Course of
Consumer Paper, 8 AM. Bus. J.L. 253 (1971); Note, Bills and Notes-The Close
Association Doctrine Revisited, 16 LoY. L. REV. 457 (1970); Comment, Judicial
Limitation on Holder in Due Course Claim, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 439 (1971). See also
Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
Other courts have held waiver of defense clauses invalid as oppressive terms in
contracts of adhesion and thus against public policy. See, e.g., Gross v. Appelgren, 171
Colo. 7, 467 P.2d 789 (1970); Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953).
Contra, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
States that have eliminated the use of waiver of defense clauses in consumer credit
contracts include Alabama, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and Washington. Status of UCC § 9-206, supra
note 11, at 689.
Some courts have held that a promissory note accompanying the contract of
sale is merged into the contract and thus inseparable from its terms. See, e.g.,
Equipment Acceptance Corp. v. Arwood Can Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1941);
International Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965). Still
other courts have bypassed the intent of the U.C.C. by applying an objective test of
good faith in judging the status of the holder. See, e.g., Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232
A.2d 405 (1967).
32. See Hartman & Walker, The Holder in Due Course and the Consumer, 77
COM. L. J. 116 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Holder in Due Course].
33. All American jurisdictions except Puerto Rico and Canal Zone have
adopted the U.C.C., although states have made numerous changes. See UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. Directory of Acts (1976).
34. The basis of the holder in due course is given in U.C.C. § 3-302. This section
states that if the holder of a negotiable instrument takes it in good faith without notice
of a defense to the instrument and gives value, he is a holder in due course. This status
permits the holder to cut off the debtor's defenses, but in § 3-305 those defenses not cut
off are listed:
a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
c) such misrepresentation as has induced tl~e party to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain
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Code (U.C.C.C.) 5 takes a more positive stand against separation of
duties to cut off defenses. According to the U.C.C.C., the seller may
not accept any negotiable instrument other than a check as payment,36 while the use of the waiver of defenses device is greatly
restricted.37 The proposed Model Consumer Credit Act (C.C.A.) takes
knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-305.
The test of good faith by the holder is "honesty in fact" in the taking-a subjective
test. U.C.C. § 1-201(19). The test of notice is objective, yet the holder must have notice
of an actual defense in existence at the time of the taking. U.C.C. § 1-201(26) (1962
version). Mere knowledge of a limitation such as a security agreement is not sufficient
to destroy the HDC status.
Where waiver of defenses is used a different section applies:
[A]n agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert against an
assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in
good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of
a type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper.
U.C.C. § 9-206. This gives the holder of a consumer credit contract all the rights of an
HDC. U.C.C. § 9-206, however, expressly limits the effectiveness of these waivers if
there are other conflicting state laws; subsection one reads, "[s]ubject to any statute or
decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods...."
In Comment 2 following the section, the drafters acknowledged that some legislatures
had restricted the use of such waivers: "[t]his Article takes no position on the
controversial question of whether a buyer of consumer goods may effectively waive
defenses." See Status of UCC § 9-206, supra note 11, at 687.
35. The U.C.C.C. was drafted in the summer of 1968 and published in final
form in 1969. It has since been adopted in eleven states: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Wisconsin, Wyoming. UNIFORM
LAWS ANN. 36 (Supp. 1976).
36. "[T]he seller or lessor may not take a negotiable instrument other than a
check as evidence of the obligation of the buyer or lessee. A holder is not in good faith if
he takes a negotiable instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of this
section." U.C.C.C. § 2.403 (1969 Official Text) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.]. For a
generally critical analysis of the U.C.C.C. approach to separation see Topucki, The
Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumers' Code-or Lendors' Code, 22 U. FLA. L.
REV. 335 (1970).
37. U.C.C.C. § 2.404 offers two alternative means of dealing with the waiver of
defense clause. Alternative A [Assignee Subject to Defenses] makes the waiver clause
unenforceable. Alternative B [When Assignee Not Subject to Defenses] permits the
waiver but requires the assignor to notify the consumer of the assignment. The
consumer is given three months after notice in which he can assert defenses. "This
agreement is enforceable only with respect to claims or defenses which have arisen
before the end of the 3-month period after notice was mailed." This alternative has
been severely criticized for the nominal protection it offers. Fritz, Would the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code Help the Consumer?, 25 Bus. LAw. 511, 514 (1970). Contra
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an even stronger stand against separation in consumer transactions.

Unfortunately, neither the U.C.C.C. nor the C.C.A. has been adopted
by very many states. 39
In each of these attempts, reunion of the obligation of the

consumer to pay with the duty of the seller to perform was deemed
the best answer to the problem facing the consumer. Reunion of the
transactional duties was aimed at maintaining reciprocal duties, but
it was generally not concerned with maintaining the same parties.

Thus the duties may have been reunited, with the parties involved
being the consumer and creditor. Several reasons may be suggested
for the emphasis on reunion. Reunion provides the consumer with an

immediate remedy to the seller's breach in that the consumer may
simply stop payment. Further, it shifts the burden of initiating

litigation to the creditor.40 While minimizing the cost of breach
within the whole system, reunion diffuses the cost of breach to reflect
and social cost more naturally.

Striving to avoid the effect of the U.C.C.'s clear intent to sanction
separation and the cutting off of defenses, past attempts at reunion

have created new problems and revitalized old ones. First, most
states have not gone far enough in protecting the consumer from the

effects of separation. 41 Second, new interpretations of the U.C.C.
have created confusion as to what the Code really means. 42 Finally,
OKLA.

STAT. ANN. 14A § 2-404 (West 1969) (time period reduced to thirty days). See

MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT Introduction iv (1973).

38. This act was proposed for state adoption by the National Consumer Law
Center in Boston, as an alternative to a perceived void left by the U.C.C.C.:
At the same time the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the initial version of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC). Consumer dissatisfaction with the UCCC was so
widespread, however, that it became immediately apparent that the need
for reform at the state level was to remain unfulfilled. In an attempt to fill
the void the [NCLC] published in 1970 the National Consumer Act (NCA)
as a model bill to which legislatures could look for a standard.
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT Introduction iv (1973). The C.C.A. makes the transferee
or lendor of a consumer liable in all cases to claims of the consumer against the seller
and if that transferee or lendor is in good faith the creditor or transferee is liable only
to the extent of the loan. C.C.A. §§ 2.601-2.604.
39. See note 34 supra. No state has fully adopted the C.C.A.
40. This seems to follow the goals of the FTC. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506 (1975). See
note 25 supra and accompanying text.
41. See Walker, Holder in Due Course, supra note 31, at 127.
42. While the U.C.C. requires quite clearly that the holder take without
subjective knowledge of a defense to qualify as an HDC, the added requirements of
International Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965), and
Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967), create confusion as to what the
U.C.C. really requires of the transferee to qualify as an HDC. See note 30 supra.
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these attempts have created a great deal of variation and conflict
among the states-a result that directly frustrates the unifying
purpose of the U.C.C. and of all commercial law. 43 The FTC's intent
in adopting the Seller Rule was to respond to all three of these
problems. 44
Separation of transactional duties creates great potential for
harm to the consumer when the transferee or creditor is an HDC or
holds the commercial paper with all the rights of one. Should the
seller breach his duty, the consumer is forced to continue payment for
the goods or services while being unable to seek the logical remedy of
non-payment. If the seller is not available for suit, the consumer is
totally without recourse. Previous attempts to alleviate this danger
by reunion of the transactional duties have caused more problems:
disuniformity, confusion, and conflict. It was in this atmosphere that
the FTC promulgated the Seller Rule.
THE SCOPE AND SCHEME OF THE SELLER RULE

In an economy in which many sellers and consumers deal in more
than one state, the need for a nationally uniform remedy was urgent.
The combined impact of the previous approaches to reunion had not
been sufficient to create adequate nationwide protection and
failed to develop uniformity and clarity in the field. In promulgating
the Seller Rule, the FTC attempted to bring clarity, uniformity
remedy to preservation of consumers' claims and
and meaningful
45
defenses.
Evaluation of the Seller Rule since its implementation indicates
that it has the potential for being a significant step in the
preservation of consumers' rights. While the primary goal behind
the Rule is to prevent the foreclosure of consumer defenses, 46 its
proclaimed broader goals are to minimize the overall social costs
produced by seller breach and to internalize those costs which cannot
be limited, thus keeping the costs within the price establishment
system of the- seller and creditor. 47 To do this, the Seller Rule
43. The underlying purpose and policy of the U.C.C. is "to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions" and "to make uniform the
law among various jurisdictions." U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
44. "[A] Trade Regulation Rule should serve the threefold function of
uniformity, fairness, and clarity." 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53525 (1975).
45. See id. at 53515.
46.

FTC, STAFF

GUIDELINES

ON TRADE

REGULATION

RULE CONCERNING

PRESERVATION OF CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF GUIDELINES].
47. Concerning minimizing cost of seller breach, the FTC stated, "[F]irst we
would employ our remedial authority to modify existing commercial behavior such
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encompasses three specific types of transactions: when promissory
notes are used in consumer sales, when waiver of defense clauses are

used in consumer credit contracts, and when the seller refers the
consumer to a particular creditor for a purchase money loan. 48 The

Seller Rule's ability to achieve its goals while maintaining uniformity, clarity and fairness is a matter calling for constant re-

evaluation.
The Underlying Scheme of the Seller Rule
Like previous attempts at preservation of claims, the Seller Rule

is designed to "prevent sellers from foreclosing consumer equities in
credit sale transactions .

.

. [and to] prevent the use of direct loan

foreclosing to accord the same end. '49 The fundamental belief behind
the method of the Seller Rule was that the holder in due course
concept has no place in consumer transactions because it throws the

cost of seller breach onto individual consumers. 50 The FTC desired to
51
return the cost to the seller and then spread it among all consumers.
By preserving the consumer's claims and defenses, the FTC sought to

accomplish two ends: to minimize the social cost of seller breach to its
lowest level within the retail distribution system, and to internalize
the costs which cannot be eliminated.
By "internalization" the Commission intended that the cost of
individual breach either be absorbed by the creditor or passed back
to the seller by the use of recourse mechanisms often employed
between such parties. 52 Most of the cost should ultimately be returned
that the costs occasioned by seller misconduct in the consumer market are reduced to
the lowest possible level in the retail distribution system." 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53523
(1975). Internalization was also characterized: "Second, where certain seller misconduct costs cannot be eliminated from the market we would require that such costs be
internalized, so that the prices paid by consumers more accurately reflect the true
social costs of engaging in a credit sale transaction." Id.
48. Id. at 53524-25. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
49. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53522 (1975).
50. "Our primary concern, in the course of these proceedings, has been the
distribution or allocation of costs occasioned by seller misconduct in credit sale
transactions." Id.
51. Id. at 53523.
52.
We believe that a rule which compels creditors to either absorb seller
misconduct costs or return them to sellers, by denying sellers access to cut
off devices will discourage many of the predatory practices and schemes
...
. The Commission has received substantial evidence that such
agreements are routinely employed in sales-finance transactions, and that
the provisions contained therein can be tailor-made to the needs of both
parties.
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to the breaching party. That cost which could not be returned should
be absorbed and passed on to the consumer as borrower, thus
resulting in a more accurate reflection of "the actual costs of sales
finance."5 3 In each of these instances the cost of breach would be
retained in the price structure; it would not fall on individual
consumers but would be a part of the cost of goods and credit.
The Rule was also designed to minimize the social cost of the
seller's breach. This was to be achieved in two ways. If the creditor
were made responsible for the breach of the seller, then he would
refrain from forming business affiliations with or purchasing notes
or contracts from disreputable sellers.5 In this way the source of
credit on which such sellers rely would be dried up. Further, the FTC
determined that the creditor was in a better position to return the
breach cost to the seller than was the consumer. 55 The process by
which the consumer would return the cost to the seller often included
litigation. Under the Seller Rule, while much more of the breach cost
would be returned, it could be done by non-payment on the part of the
consumer. The creditor could then employ any number of techniques
to guard against seller breach and readily return the cost when
breach occurs. This would be much more economical than a
consumer attempt to return the cost directly to the seller. Among
these devices the creditor might use are his access to information
systems, ready means of initiating lawsuits, familiarity with the legal
process, and contractual agreements for facilitating return to the
seller.5 6 Further, mere affiliation with the seller over a period of time
would place the creditor in a much better position to guard against
breach.57 The FTC determined that these attributes of the creditor
help provide for enforcement more efficient than that available to the
consumer. Therefore in placing the burden of returning the cost of
seller breach on the creditor, the overall social cost of the breach
would be minimized.
A hypothetical case may more clearly illustrate how costs are
minimized and internalized by the Seller Rule. Ryle purchased fifty
pairs of shoes for his soccer team from Peele's Hop Shop. To pay for
53. Id.
54. "Creditors will simply not accept the risks generated by the truly
unscrupulous merchant. The market will be policed in this fashion and all parties will
benefit accordingly." Id.
55. "As a practical matter, the creditor is always in a better position than the
buyer to return seller misconduct costs to sellers, the guilty party." Id.
56. Id.
57. It could be argued, however, that the consumer who deals directly with
the seller is best able to protect himself from fraud. See id. at 53517-21.
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the shoes, which cost $20 a pair, Peele directed Ryle to Easy Credit
Finance (E.C.). After acquiring a loan for $1000, Ryle discovered that
the shoes were defective. Without the aid of the Seller Rule, Ryle
would have to continue making payments to E.C. and file suit against
Peele if he refused to correct the situation. Unaware of his legal
rights, Ryle would also have to obtain the services of a lawyer to sue
for restitution. If Ryle would win his case, Peele would pass the cost of
the breach and the litigation on to all consumers. Should Peele be
judgment-proof, Ryle would have to take the shoes as they were and
pay the complete price to the creditor.58
The Seller Rule requires that the creditor (E.C.) assume responsibility for the seller's (Peele's) breach. If the consumer (Ryle) has a
valid defense against the seller, he may assert it against the creditor.
At this point the creditor has three options. E.C. could sue the
consumer for payment, threaten the consumer with a bad credit
rating for failure to pay, or accept the consumer's defense as valid. If
the creditor were to sue the consumer for payment, the consumer
may assert defenses; if the defenses are valid, the loss will fall on the
creditor. Should the creditor choose to apply pressure on the
consumer, the consumer may file suit affirmatively to clear his credit
rating. 59 Whether returned by one of these methods or by the creditor
simply accepting the consumer's defense, most costs are returned to
the seller by means of a contract or litigation mechanism. These
mechanisms, according to the FTC, work more economically so that
all costs are internalized and at less social cost. Thus, while the
creditor is now returning all breach costs to the seller, forcing him to
charge more for his product, this is a smaller social cost than the
combined cost without the Rule.
The clear scheme of the Seller Rule, then, is to prevent the cutting
off of consumers' defenses and thereby to make the creditor initially
responsible for the seller's breach. The responsibility would in turn
reduce availability of credit to disreputable sellers, minimize the
overall cost of seller breach because of the ease with which the
creditor can act, and internalize breach cost by returning it to the
seller where it is spread to all consumers evenly in the form of higher
58. This hypothetical case assumes that this state has neither passed special
legislation on consumer credit nor developed comparable theories in common law. See
notes 29 and 30 supra.
59. The FTC recognized the possible impact non-payment may have on the
consumer's credit rating. Therefore the Rule gives the consumer the right to bring
suit against the creditor for payments already made which exceed the value received
by the consumer. This would clear up the credit rating as well. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506,
53524 (1975).
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prices. To construct this scheme the FTC extended the scope of the
Seller Rule only to particular transactions and parties.
Consumer Transactions Affected by the Seller Rule
The Seller Rule affects three situations in which the seller and
creditor were previously able to separate the transactional duties.
These three cases are transactions in which a promissory note is
signed in addition to the sales contract; transactions in which a
consumer credit contract contains a waiver of defenses clause; and
transactions in which60 the consumer receives his loan from a creditor
related to the seller.
When the seller has the consumer sign a promissory note in
addition to the contract, the Rule requires that the notice of
preservation become part of the agreement.6 1 As a part of the
agreement the notice should be placed in the note itself. This would
not destroy the negotiability of the note, as the notice is only of a
possible, not an actual, defense.62 The purchaser of such a note may
technically be an HDC under U.C.C. § 3-302, but he would be subject
to all of the terms of the note, including preservation of consumer
claims and defenses.
The second type of transaction encompassed by the Seller Rule is
the consumer sale in which the credit contract with the seller
contains a waiver of defenses against subsequent transferees. In this
transaction no note is used or negotiated, but the credit contract,
when assigned, achieves the same purpose for the seller. The FTC
Staff Guidelines state that the notice must be placed in this type of
contract unconditionally so as to insure the liability of the transferee
to defenses of payment held by the consumer. 63 The FTC, however,
left the seller a ready means of avoiding the impact of the notice, as it
stated: "When the text of the notice is qualified by additional
language, the contract fails to 'contain' the required notice." 64 With
a waiver in the contract in addition to the notice, the
Commission suggests, the waiver will have precedence, as the notice
is then considered not "contained" in the contract. 65 Although this
60.

See note 22 supra and accompanying text. The FTC, however, only noted

three of these transactions in its Staff Guidelines. STAFF GUIDELINES, supranote 46, at
9.
61. Id. at 5. See also 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53524 (1975).
62. A negotiable instrument is not made non-negotiable by the inclusion of a
limitation of liability or of a notice of a possible defense. U.C.C. § 3-119(1).
63. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 6.
64. Id.
65. Id. [1974 - Transfer Binder] CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE CCH fT98, 295,
98,296 (1977).
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would then be a violation of the Seller Rule and thus subject the seller
to FTC investigation, this may be of little help to the consumer who
simply desires to assert immediately his defenses as guaranteed in
the notice, without having to rely on FTC enforcement procedures.6
The Commission considered both the waiver of defenses clause
and the promissory note to be boilerplate forced on the consumer in a
contract of adhesion. 6 Consequently, the FTC considered both to be
void as against public policy. In the Statement of Basis and Purpose
issued in conjunction with the Seller Rule, the Commission stated:
"We have reached a determination that it constitutes an unfair and
deceptive practice to use contractual boilerplate to separate a buyer's
duty to pay from a seller's duty to perform." The FTC may find that
use of such devices is invalid as an unfair and deceptive practice if the
notice is not included in the proper note or contract. 69 The consumer,
however, may assert his defenses directly, without resort to the FTC,
only if the notice is included; without the notice there is no state law
basis upon which to base his right to assert these claims. The
by the FTC-a right historically
only right he has is that created
70
unenforceable in the courts.
The most progressive, and most confusing aspect of the Seller
Rule is its inclusion of the vendor-related or interlocking loan
transaction.7'1 The Rule applies here only to those contracts arising
between creditor and consumer where the consumer intends to use
the proceeds for purchase from a seller "related" to the creditor. The
Commission's definition of "related" was ambiguous in the Statement
of Basis and Purpose.7 2 In that statement the Commission revealed
that it had received "substantial evidence that sellers work cooperatively with the lenders to foreclose consumer equities. 73 In a later
66. See note 135 infra and accompanying text.
67. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53523 (1975).
68. Id. at 53524.
69. What the Seller Rule actually does is define more clearly the general
prohibition of Congress against unfair and deceptive practices. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45 et seq.
(1975). The unfair and deceptive act should really be identified as the cutting off of
consumer claims, not merely the omission of the prescribed notice. The Rule, however,
identifies only the failure to place the notice in proper contracts as the unfair practice.
16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975).
70. See note 167 infra and accompanying text.
71. See Note, "Dragging the Body" - Deceptive Automobile Financing in
Pennsylvania: With Proposed Legislative Remedies, 34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 429 (1973).
72. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53525 (1975).
73. Id.
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cooperative aspect of the connecpublication the FTC explained the
74
tion between creditor and selle.
The nature of the cooperation between seller and creditor
sufficient to bring the consumer credit contract within the purview of
the Rule was indicated in the definition of the terms "purchase money
loan," "contract" and "business arrangement." The definition of these
terms include,
[a]ll formal and informal arrangements and procedures
which, based on the record, would justify imputation of
an established and continuing course of dealing between a
lender and a seller .

.

.

. We are not persuaded that

knowledge alone suggests a course of dealing, even though
questions of a creditor's knowledge are relevant to a
determination of his relationship with a seller ....[W]e are

persuaded that while the act of referral is sufficient to
justify imposition of the rule, provided referrals are made
in the course of some routine or arrangement,there is no
justification for choosing a specific number [of referrals]. 75
The definition denotes two types of cooperation: a course of
dealing, or affiliation, and referral. The distinction between these
two may be academic, for they often overlap. The real problem is
discerning what constitutes "continuing course of dealing" and
"referral in the course of some routine." According to the Staff
Guidelines, affiliation between the seller and creditor adequate to
require the notice could arise in a number of ways. 76 Among the more
usual of these ways are where the creditor and seller are under
common control; where the two are connected by a contract; and
where there is a business arrangement between them. Generally,
"[c]ooperative activity on a continuing basis (over a period of time) is
'77
what is specified by the Rule.
The Staff Guidelines also detail the types of referrals necessary
to create a relationship between the parties sufficient to trigger the
74. "We believe that the record in this proceeding supports application of the
rule to all situations where concerted or cooperative conduct between sellers and

creditors is employed ...." Id. See also 41 Fed. Reg. 34594 (1976).
75. 40 FED. REG. 53506, 53525 (1975). See also STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note
46, at 14-16.

76. Those situations indicative of a cooperative arrangement listed by the
FTC include: relation by blood or marriage, relation due to preparation of forms,
relations due to processing credit application, common control, joint venture, payment
of consideration by creditor to seller, guarantee of loan by seller, five or more loans by
creditor to seller's consumers, relation by knowledge. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53515 (1975).
77. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 16.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss2/3

et al.: The FTC's Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consume
.1977]

CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

Seller Rule. 8 The seller's actions must show that "he is doing more
than passively engaging in an information process." 79 When the
seller, by regularly naming a particular source of credit, does more
than supply loan information to the consumer by actually advocating
the use of a particular creditor, then a referral relationship arises.
Regardless of number of referrals, the Commission seems to require
some communication between the parties. The number of referrals,
however, may be one factor in determining the existence of a
relationship. Once there are sufficient referrals of the proper nature
to imply a relationship between the seller and creditor, all loans
issued to consumers purchasing from a related seller must contain
the notice, even if that particular consumer had not been referred. 0
In a staff evaluation the Federal Reserve Board asked the FTC
to be more specific as to the duties of banks under the Seller Rule. 81 In
making this request, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System highlighted the vagueness evident in the Rule:
[The] possible scope of the term "business arrangement"
and the provision regarding "referrals" are such that
banks do not know when loan contracts will have to include
the notice to avoid placing the seller who accepts the
proceeds of the loan in possible violation. Banks are also
unsure of their possible liabilities, should they decide to
make such consumer loans under contracts containing the
notice. 82
Aware of the ambiguity of its definitions, the FTC issued a
revised Statement of Enforcement Policy in an attempt to clarify the
two forms of "relation."'8 3 The Commission stated that the affiliation
must be one associated or concerned primarily with the advancement
of credit to the consumer. Thus, a commercial checking account, or
any commercial agreement "which has no relationship to consumer
sales activities or the financing thereof," would be inadequate to
impute a course of dealing.84 This statement also underlined the fact
that no consideration need pass between the seller and creditor.8 5
78. It should be noted that actually referral is merely another form of
affiliation between the seller and creditor, but it is one which appears to be at arms
length while often it is not.
79. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 14.
80. 41 Fed. Reg. 34594 (1976).
81. Comments of the Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System on the FTC Rule Entitled "Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses" 1
(May 5, 1976).
82. Id. at 2
83. 41 Fed. Reg. 34594 (1976).
84. 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) fT 38,031 (1976).
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The Statement of Enforcement Policy also clarified the scope of
referral by the seller. While earlier definitions mentioned only that
referral must emanate from some routine or arrangement, the
Statement of Enforcement Policy focused on the nature of that
routine:
The intent of this provision is to reach those situations in
which a seller cooperates with a lender to channel consumers to that credit source on a continuing basis. Unlike
an "affiliation," which contemplates some pre-existing
arrangement or agreement, a referral relationship arises
from a pattern of cooperative activity directly relating to
the arrangement of credit.8
Application of the Seller Rule on the basis of referrals, then, requires
the showing of three things: first, that the seller channels consumers
to a particular creditor (though he may do so with more than one
creditor); second, that he does so on a continuing basis; and third, that
the creditor knows that the consumers in general are being referred
to him. As with affiliation, no consideration need pass between the
parties. If each of those conditions are met, then a relationship exists,
and credit contracts issued by the related creditor for purchases from
the seller must contain the designated notice.
The key concept to understanding the scope of referral cooperation is that there must be a "pattern." An occasional referral would
not suffice if there were no intended or resulting pattern. No
minimum number of referrals is explicitly required, although the
Commission did state that the number required before a pattern is
found will vary depending on exterior factors such as population and
business climate.8 7 A pattern may be based on the seller's intent or
inferred from the number of referrals made. When there is sufficient
evidence to conclude that there is a pattern, the notice must be
incorporated in all contracts resulting from purchase money loans
given to the affiliated seller's customers.
Although the creditor must have knowledge that the seller is
referring consumers to him before a referral relationship will be
recognized, he need not know of the particular consumer's referral.
Example Seven of the Statement of Enforcement Policy suggests
that when a buyer independently obtains a purchase money loan from
85. Ld at 41,135-4.
86. Id. at 41,135-3 (emphasis added). See National Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. FTC,
421 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. La. 1976); STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 14.
87. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 14.
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the particular
a related seller, the notice must be included-"whether
88
loan contract was a product of a referral or not.
When determining whether the notice is required in a particular credit contract, it is not important whether a particular
referral has been made. The only important points are whether there
is a relationship and whether the seller had knowledge of the source
of the consumer's loan.89 It is, however, important to show particular
referrals when proving the existence of the relationship. The
following graph illustrates the paramount importance of the seller's
knowledge. Further, unless there is a general established relationship, neither the parties' knowledge nor the fact of a particular
referral will bring the consumer credit transaction within the reach
of the Seller Rule. 90

Relationship
X
X
X
X
X
X

Particular Seller
Referral Knowledge
X
X

Creditor
Knowledge

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

Notice?
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES

Although the Seller Rule applies to three basic types of
transactions, not all transactions of these types are subject to the
88. 41 Fed. Reg. 34594 (1976).
89. Knowledge may be either actual or constructive, attributed to related
sellers by "objective circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id. at 34595.
90. This would be different if the proposed FTC amendment to the Seller Rule
were adopted. This so-called Creditor Rule would place the same burden on the
creditor to assure that the Notice is included in the appropriate contracts as presently
exists for the seller. The relevant portion of the amendment reads:
In connection with any Purchase Money Loan ...or any sale or lease of
goods or services, in or affecting commerce .....it constitutes an unfair
or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of [the FTCA]
for a seller or a creditor, directly or indirectly, to take or receive a
consumer credit contract which fails to contain the following provision in
at lease ten point, bold face type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT Is SUBJECT To ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS
HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL BE
LIMITED To AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.

40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53530 (1975).
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notice requirement. There are other limitations. Foremost among
these is that the sale must be to a consumer and not a commercial
user. 91 Any purchase for agricultural purposes is therefore excluded.9 2 Sales of real property, commodities and securities are also
excluded. 93 All limits placed on the scope of the Truth-in-Lending
Act and Regulation Z also apply to the Seller Rule. 94 This means that
where the sale is in excess of $25,0009 or involves a public utility
service,9 the Rule does not apply. Finally, when the Rule is applied
because of an interlocking loan, unless a substantial portion of the
loan is used to purchase from an affiliated seller, the credit contract
97
does not come within the requirements of the Seller Rule.
These limitations remain minor in light of the broad scope of the
Seller Rule-a scope which encompasses three of the five basic
methods of separation of transactional duties in consumer sales: the
promissory note transaction, the credit contract with a waiver of
defenses, and the vendor-related loan. In each of these, the Seller
Rule requires the prescribed notice be included, thus preserving the
consumer's right to assert defenses against subsequent holders of the
note or contract. Consequently, the duties and rights of the consumer,
creditor and seller are affected.
Consumers Included-Rights Conferred
A consumer is defined for purposes of the Seller Rule as "a
natural person who seeks to acquire goods or services for personal,
family, or household use. ' 98 According to this definition a wholesale
91. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975); STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 9.
92. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975).
93. Id.
94. Both the purchase money loan and the financing of a sale for purposes of
the Seller Rule were limited "within the meaning of the Truth-in-Lending Act and
Regulation Z." 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603 (1968).
95. At FTC hearings many sellers of more expensive goods suggested an even
lower limit. They argued that consumers who purchase consumer goods in excess of
$5000 are generally more sophisticated and less likely to be cheated. Further, these
sellers contended they have greater need for immediate transferability of their notes
and contracts to maintain the more costly inventory. The FTC found these arguments
unconvincing. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53527 (1975). There does seem to be a sound
argument for maintaining some limit, as otherwise the creditor would be an insurer of
long term loan contracts.
96. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 12.
97. This means that if the loan is used for a number of purchases only one of
which is from a related seller, the notice is not required. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1975);
STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46.
98. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(b) (1975); [1974 - Transfer Binder] CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE CCH 1198,294 (1977) (credit purchase of vending machine not a consumer
purchase).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss2/3

et al.: The FTC's Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consume
1977]

CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

purchase or business transfer would not be within the Rule. The
transfer must be the final transfer in the retail chain. The reason for
excluding intermediaries from the protection of the Seller Rule is
that the wholesaler is considered "in the business" and thus able to
protect himself adequately. The wholesaler is likely to possess many
of the legal and contract recourse devices which would place costs on
the seller even without the Rule. 99
It is questionable whether the Rule includes purchases by
consumer cooperatives. The Staff Guidelines indicate that the Rule
would not preserve the claims of the consumer when the purchase is
by this method. 1°° Yet, since consumer cooperatives are rarely in as
good a position to protect against seller fraud as is a full-time
business or financier, the policy reasons for applying the Seller Rule
exist to preserve the defenses of the cooperative as well as the
individual.
Where the notice is included in a consumer credit contract, the
consumer may assert against the holder of the contract or note any
claim or defense which he could have asserted against the seller, 101
including all tort and contract claims. The claims may not exceed the
amount paid or loaned by the holder and are limited to only those
claims arising from transactions which that creditor financed. This
also means that if the seller limited his own liability by the use of
waivers, those same limitations apply to the consumer in an action
against subsequent holders. 102
The general rule is that all consumers, and consumers only, who
purchase on credit from the seller directly or on credit from a source
related to the seller, are entitled to the protection of the Seller Rule.
As will be seen, the consumer, although apparently protected by the
Seller Rule, may still find his defenses cut off, because either the
creditor or the seller may not be within the scope of the Rule.
99. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 9; 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53523 (1975).
100. The Staff Guidelines do not speak directly to this point, but state, "Nor
does the Rule apply when a purchase is made by or for an organizationrather than a
natural person." STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 8 (emphasis added). Contra, I
TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL § 1.03(3Xb) (1975).
101. "It [Seller Rule] will require that all consumer credit contracts generated
by consumer sales include a provision which allows the consumer to assert his salesrelated claims and defenses against any holder of the credit obligation." 40 Fed. Reg.
53506, 53524 (1975).
102. Thus, if the seller were to disclaim all warranties in accordance with
U.C.C. § 2-316, the disclaimer would apply to the creditor as well. STAFF GUIDELINES,
supra note 46, at 7-8. See also [1974 - Transfer Binder] CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
CCH
98,271 (1977).
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Creditors Included in the Seller Rule
The Seller Rule does not place a direct duty on any creditor to
place the notice in the proper contracts or to inform the seller of the
source of a consumer's purchase money loan. The nature of the
creditor, however, is important in determining whether a duty rests
on the seller to abide by the Rule and to insure that notice is included.
The Rule imposes a duty on the seller only when the creditor who is
related to the seller is a person or corporation who "inthe ordinary
course of business, lends purchase money or finances the sale of goods
or services to consumers on a deferred payment basis.' ' 0 3 As a direct
lender, the creditor need not include the notice if he is not in the
business of making loans, even if he is affiliated with the seller. 10 4
Private party lenders, therefore, do not subject the seller to the notice
requirement. 0 5 Such a creditor may, however, be unable to cut off the
consumer's defenses under other state law theories.' ° If the creditor
is one who purchases notes or contracts drafted by the seller, his
nature is of no consequence, as all such notes and contracts must
contain the notice of preservation.
The Seller's Duty
Unlike the creditor's responsibility, the seller's duty under the
Rule is direct and affirmative. That duty is to insure that the
prescribed notice is placed in all consumer credit contracts and notes
that meet the Rule's definitions. The FTC has also proposed a
corresponding duty to be applied to the creditor, 107 but until that
proposal is adopted, the seller has the sole responsibility for including
the notice.
When the seller also performs as a creditor he must place the
notice in all credit contracts which he drafts with consumers.
Regardless of his intent to hold all notes or contracts, the notice must
be included; however, a violation would only be meaningful upon
transfer. 08 If the seller employs an open-ended credit arrangement,
103.

16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c) (1975) (emphasis added). See also [1974 - Transfer

Binder] CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE CCH 98,272 (1977) (insurance premium financing
not included).
104. However, if he is affiliated with the seller but not in the business of
making loans, those states recognizing the close-connectedness" doctrine would still
find the lender subject to claims against the seller. See note 30 supra.
105. I TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL § 1.03(2) (1970). See also 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(a)

(1975).
106. See note 30 supra.
107. See note 130 infra.
108. This conclusion is inevitable since the consumer is burdened only when
the seller breaches and the right to payment has been transferred to another.
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he must insert the notice in the original agreement, but he need not
renew it every time further credit is advanced. 10 9
In the vendor-related or interlocking loan transaction, the
seller's duty is somewhat different due to the fact that the Rule
requires the creditor to actually place the notice in the appropriate
contracts, while it identifies the selleras the violator when such notice
is not included. The standard of the seller's duty is a combined objective and subjective one. If the seller has objective knowledge that the
consumer is using the proceeds of a loan from a related creditor, then
the seller has a particular affirmative duty to ascertain whether the
loan was in fact from a related creditor. 10 Whether he has
sufficiently discovered the source of the loan is judged subjectively.
Before the seller has a duty to determine the source of the loan,
however, a reasonable inference from the surrounding situation must
place him on notice that a loan was used. The seller is not required to
initiate an investigation into the source of every consumer's funds.
When the seller does receive reasonable notice from surrounding
circumstances that the consumer is using proceeds of a loan, he must
determine whether the loan was extended by a related creditor.",
Initially this may require simply asking the consumer where he
received his loan. If the consumer refuses to divulge the source or if
the seller has reason to believe the consumer is lying, he would have
an affirmative duty to check with any creditor with whom he is
related to see whether it issued the loan." 2 If the loan was made by
a related creditor, the seller may not accept the proceeds thereof until
the notice designated in the Seller Rule is inserted into the loan
contract.
The notice of preservation of consumer's claims and defenses
against subsequent holders is deceptively simple. The notice operates
in state contract law to preserve defenses in three types of transaction: promissory notes, waiver of defense clauses, and vendorrelated loans. When the seller acts initially as the creditor, the scope
109.
110.

STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 10.
41 Fed. Reg. 34594 (1976).

111. In the Commission's later "Statement of Enforcement Policy," this
hypothetical was given with the concluding comment: "When the seller has a
relationship with a creditor, the best source of information concerning the Notice is the
creditor. He cannot escape liability through the ignorance of the buyer." 41 Fed. Reg.
34594, 34597 (1976).
112. While no statement is directly on point, it appears from FTC hypotheticals
that if the seller has a reasonable belief that the consumer is using a purchase money
loan, based on any surrounding fact, he must determine the source of the loan and
if it was from a related creditor, whether the Notice was included. Id.
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of the Seller Rule is universal, as all such consumer credit contracts
must contain the notice, When the related creditor extends credit to
consumers, the seller must assure that the notice is included only if
the creditor is either affiliated with the seller or if they are related by
a pattern of referrals. On the surface the Rule appears to be simple
and complete; a more stringent analysis indicates several possible
problems with its scope and impact.
PROBLEMS WITH THE SELLER RULE

The Seller Rule is too recent a development to permit a certain
determination of problems in its mechanics and application. However, certain potential problems with the Seller Rule are evident. If
these problems should materialize, they would reduce the effectiveness of the Rule. Among these problems is the interesting possibility
that the effect of the Rule may be to narrow its own sphere of
application to the poor consumer who has a marginal credit rating,
while the more affluent consumer with a good credit rating will
generally avoid the protection of the Rule voluntarily by seeking
cheaper sources of credit. Another possible trend detrimental to the
stated FTC intent is that the social cost of seller breach may even
increase if the Rule spawns a large number of spurious claims by the
consumer. The Seller Rule may also have the affect of reducing the
availability of credit and increasing its costs. 1 13 Finally, there is
serious doubt that the Rule is adequate as it now exists, as it fails to
apply to creditors in any transaction or to any party in the credit card
transaction. 114 For the Seller Rule to have significant impact, it
should operate more rapidly and at less cost to the individual
consumer than would a direct suit against the seller. Whether or not
the Rule satisfies this requirement will deserve continuing evaluation.
When the Seller Rule was promulgated, the FTC made it clear
that the intent was to remove the cost of seller breach from the
individual consumer, to return it to the seller-often by way of the
creditor-and eventually to disperse it among all consumers in the
form of slightly higher prices.1 5 What the Rule is likely to do,
however, is work in such a way as to limit its own scope to the poorer
consumer, and in so doing, to spread the cost of breach only among
consumers who purchase from sellers who cater to low income
113. For FTC discussion on this point see 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53519 (1975).
114. See note 89 supra.
115. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53522 (1975).
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customers. 116 This may be seen by analyzing both the consumer's and
creditor's points of view.
When the consumer makes a credit purchase he has three
options: to buy on credit with the seller, to obtain credit from a
creditor related to the seller, or to obtain credit from an independent
creditor. If he gets credit from the seller, the Seller Rule will always
apply." 7 Should the seller not offer his own credit plan but send the
consumer to a related creditor, the consumer must decide whether to
borrow from that creditor or go elsewhere. In analyzing how the
consumer makes this decision, several factors are important. First,
the related creditor will very likely charge more for the loan than the
unrelated lender." 8 The related creditor has added costs and
liabilities due to the Seller Rule and may consider the protection of
the Rule a saleable commodity. Secondly, the consumer may not be
able to go to an unrelated creditor because he has a marginal credit
rating. This, in effect, gives the creditor another reason for
increasing the cost of the loan. Consumers who have good credit
ratings, however, are generally free to obtain credit from unrelated
creditors. Most knowledgeable consumer borrowers, if given the
opportunity, 119 will pay a lower price even if that means a possibility
of being injured by seller breach. In the case of the Seller Rule,
consumers may forego the protection of the Rule in order to get
cheaper credit, taking the risk of breach. The consumers who have
the option are those not bound to use the seller's creditor, that is, the
consumers with good credit ratings. On the other hand, those
consumers unable to shop around-the marginal credit rating
consumer-are tied to the related creditor and ultimately to the
higher cost of credit.
The creditor, meanwhile, must also make a determination
whether or not to maintain a commercial relationship with a
116. For an analysis of credit practices among low-income consumers, see
FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF

(1968); Harrison, The Consumer Credit System and
the Low-Income Consumers, 13 J. FAM. L. 1 (1973); Note, Consumer Legislation and the
Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
117. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53525 (1975).
118. The Commission, however, felt that credit costs would not increase
because creditors would be lending to consumers more likely to pay. Id. at 53520.
However, if the creditor makes use of recourse mechanisms as acknowledge by the
Commission, his fear of consumers should be removed and he will be free to charge
higher prices for credit. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
119. The consumer must be aware of the options open to him before he can
make the decision. Discussing the need for consumer notice, the FTC expressed the
conviction that following a public education program consumers would be sufficiently
aware of their rights under the Seller Rule. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53527 (1975).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS
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particular seller. This determination depends directly on the nature
of that seller and his customers. When the bulk of the customers are
good credit risks, they will be able to obtain credit elsewhere, thus
reducing the amount of business that the creditor gets because of the
relationship. The creditor may resolve that he could increase his loan
market by dissolving the affiliation with the seller. By being related
to the seller, the creditor must charge more for the credit; he may be
able to make more loans by competing independently than by
developing the relationship with the seller. But if the seller's customers are unable to shop for their loans because of marginal credit
ratings, the creditor affiliated with such a seller may find it possible
and profitable to maintain the relationship, compensating for the cost
of the Seller Rule through increased prices.
It is only when the creditor maintains this relationship that the
Seller Rule operates to return and distribute breach costs. 120 Such
creditors are those dealing with the consumers with marginal credit
ratings who are likely to be poorer consumers. The result is that the
Seller Rule liabilities and costs may cause many creditors who deal
with middle or upper income consumers to disassociate themselves
from sellers and thus avoid the Seller Rule altogether, while those
related to sellers dealing with consumers with marginal credit
ratings will maintain their relationships. According to the plan
behind the Rule, these latter creditors will return costs to the seller
who in turn passes them on to his customers, the poorer consumers.
While the more affluent consumer avoids the Seller Rule, he pays
lower prices; the poorer consumer, although protected by the Rule,
pays proportionately higher prices to the creditor and the seller.
Breach costs are distributed only to poorer consumers.
This result seems to conflict with one of the FTC's major
tenets. 121 Although the Commission did intend to restrict the source of
credit relied on by certain sellers, it was the seller who posed the
greatest risk to the consumer, not the seller who deals with more
affluent consumers, who was the supposed focus of this intent.
In addition to diversifying the cost of seller breach among
consumers, the FTC expressly intended to reduce the social cost of
120. Behind this criticism is the assertion that the consumer faces the
possibility of injury from separation where the purchase money loan is not obtained
from a related creditor as well.
121. The Commission did seem to acknowledge that the Rule would affect
all classes. "They [proponents] also pointed out that consumers in all economic classes
have been harmed by application of the cutoff devices the rule will prohibit." 40 Fed.
Reg. 53506, 53520 (1975).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol11/iss2/3

et al.: The FTC's Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses: Consume
1977]

CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES

that breach by requiring the creditor to perform the actual task of
returning the cost to the seller. 122 Yet for several reasons this may not

be the result. First, whether breach cost is returned by the consumer
to the seller or by the creditor to the seller as required by the Seller
Rule, that reversion itself increases the social cost. Whenever a
breach cost is returned, the social cost increases from the mere cost to
the consumer to the cost of the breach plus the added cost of
returning costs. Since the Seller Rule will undoubtedly cause many
more consumers to return the breach cost instead of absorbing it,
there will be more reversions carried out than there were without the
Rule, thereby increasing the social cost. Secondly, the Seller Rule
may compound the stages of litigation. Before the Rule there was
generally only one step of litigation, if costs were returned at allthat between the consumer and the seller. Litigation may now be
doubled, with suits between the consumer and creditor, and between
the creditor and seller. This, too, will tend to increase the social cost of
seller breach.
Thirdly, permitting the consumer to assert his claims and
defenses by non-payment will undoubtedly encourage some consumers to withhold payment erroneously or fraudulently. 123 This will
generate further litigation between the creditor and the consumer.
Without the Rule the consumer had no theory under which to
withhold payment, while under the Rule consumers may be tempted
to use the slightest excuse for non-payment.
Finally, as the creditor and seller are required to incur
increased costs as a result of the Seller Rule, they will quite naturally
return these costs to the consumer in the form of higher prices for
goods and higher credit costs. The natural tendency on the part of
both will be to overcompensate for these costs. In addition, they will
be tempted to inform the consumer of the value of the new Rule and
thereby justify higher prices to him as the cost of the Rule's
protection in case of seller breach.
When the effect of all these costs is added together, it seems
unreasonable to contend, as the FTC does, 24 that the social cost of
seller breach will be reduced by the preservation of defenses. This is
not to say that the Seller Rule will be ineffective, but only that the
primary effect of the Rule will be to return costs to the seller and thus
122. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
123. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53523 (1975).
124. "This rule approaches these problems by reallocating the costs of seller

misconduct in the consumer market. It would, we believe, reduce these costs to the
minimum level obtainable in an imperfect system and internalize those that remain."
Id.
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diversify costs among consumers. The primary impact will not be to
minimize the social cost of that breach. The overall social cost may
well rise instead of diminish.
Several other possible problems with the Seller Rule Iare
evident. Will the Rule increase the cost of credit and limit its
availability? Much was said on this point in FTC hearings on the
then-proposed Seller Rule. 125 No one conclusion was drawn; however,
it seems clear that if the creditor is in the business of extending credit
he is not likely to reduce his level of business simply on the basis of the
Seller Rule.1 26 The result is more likely to be a change in the manner
in which the creditor extends credit than in the amount offered. As
discussed above, more credit will likely be extended directly to the
consumer and less by means of affiliation or by a referral relationship. 127 If the creditor maintains the relationship with the seller it
seems inevitable that the cost of this credit will increase somewhat to
compensate for increased costs and liabilities. Because of this factor
there will undoubtedly be certain consumers who will be unable to
afford the increased costs. This effect, by itself, would be minimal
and the unavailability of credit due to the increased cost will not
foreseeably be a major effect.
Foremost among the seeming mechanical deficiencies of the
Seller Rule is the fact that the Rule does not apply to creditors,
although in many transactions it is the creditor who actually causes
the Rule to be avoided. 128 According to its present reading, even if the
creditor knows that the consumer to whom he issues a loan intends to
purchase from a related seller, he is not required to include the notice
or to inform the seller of the source of the loan. On the contrary,
where the seller knows of the source of the loan, the notice of
preservation would be required. 129 Given a commercial relationship
which justifies recognition and application of the Seller Rule to one
party, it makes little sense to permit the other party knowingly to
130
frustrate the purpose of the Rule.
125. Id. at 53519.
126. One expert estimated that the reduction of credit available as a result of
the Rule would be minimal, ranging from five to ten per cent. REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE

36 (1972).

127. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text.
128. The creditor's action cannot be termed a violation of the Seller Rule even if
he used the most intentional and devious means to prevent the seller from discovering
the source of the consumer's loan. He has merely caused the Rule to be avoided. See
note 90 supra.
129. See notes 89 and 90 supra.
130. The FTC has proposed an amendment which would apply the Rule to the
creditor as well. 40 Fed. Reg. 53506, 53530 (1975). See note 90 supra. The difficulty
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Another possible deficiency of the Seller Rule is that it leaves
the seller with a ready means of separating the transactional duties.
He need only accept payment with a charge on the credit card of a
third party. In light of the factors needed to show affiliation between
the seller and creditor in the vendor-related loan transaction, it is
incongruous that in the credit card transaction, in which the parties
are connected by a contract, the Rule would not apply. 131 The
Commission argued that there was no indication that this method of
credit had been abused in the past, and thus it did not require a
regulation which may have adversely inhibited this growing industry.132 Yet, past evidence that this transaction has not been used by
sellers to separate the duties may be a poor indication of how the credit
card method of separation will be used in the future. 13 3 The actuality
of this problem will only become evident after the Rule has been
enforced for a period of years; thus, continued evaluation of this
transaction should be maintained.
Even considering all of these potential problems, the Seller Rule
must be considered a major step in the protection of consumers. Yet,
the injury at which the Seller Rule is aimed is one primarily affecting
only a portion of the economy - the poor consumer likely to suffer
from seller breaches. The real value of the Seller Rule depends upon
its ability to offer the individual consumer a more immediate and less
with the amendment, which places a burden on the creditor as well to place the notice
in the proper consumer credit contracts and notes, is that the FTC cannot make rules
governing banks. 15 U.S.C. § 45(aX6) (1975). However, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act of 1975 added a subsection which requires the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to promulgate a parallel rule to any FTC
rule that would affect banks. Such rules become effective within 60 days of the FTC
rule unless the Board can show good cause why the rule should not affect banks. Pub.
L. No. 93-637, § 202(a), 88 Stat. 2196 (1975), adding 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1975).
Correspondence by the Board indicates a distinct aversion to the FTC Creditor Rule.
Unless the Creditor Rule applies to banks, it will be of little effect. See Official
Correspondence of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 24,
1976). In a recent case, however, one court held that the Seller Rule was promulgated
under the new act as well as the old, and thus the FRB would be obligated to make a
parallel rule immediately, should the creditor rule be adopted as proposed. See
National Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. FTC, 421 F. Supp. 31, 34 (M.D. La. 1976). See also
Federal Reserve System Report Letter No. 29 (June 1976).
131. One of the easiest means of proving that the seller and creditor are related
for purposes of the Seller Rule is to show that the two were bound by a contract. 40 Fed.
Reg. 53506, 53515 (1975).
132. Id. at 53516-17.
133. For example, following passage of a law restricting separation by
assignment of consumer credit contracts in New York, the use of the vendor-related
loan method increased greatly to accomplish separation of transactional duties. Id. at
99,216
53515. See [1969 - 1973 Transfer Binder] CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE CCH
(1972).
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expensive means of asserting his defenses than suit against the seller,
as well as its ability to preserve a cause of action when the seller is
totally beyond the reach of the court. In any case, the Seller Rule will
only be of marginal value unless it is dynamically enforced.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE SELLER RULE

The utility of any rule of law depends in large part upon its
enforceability. With the Seller Rule, where hundreds of thousands of
sellers and creditors are affected, it is especially true that unless
capable of swift and pervasive enforcement, the Rule's substance will
be of little value. If notice of preservation of defenses is included in
the sales instrument the Seller Rule can be expediently asserted
through non-payment. TM The Rule must hold these same benefits for
those consumers whose sellers have violated the Rule by omitting the
notice. Those parties who in the past have injured consumers by
separation of duties are those who are likely to violate the notice
requirement, thereby still cutting off consumer defenses. The
Commission has determined through enactment of the Rule that
separation of transactional duties is an unfair and deceptive act, thus
suggesting that the consumer should have the protection intended by
the notice requirement even if notice is omitted. To provide this
protection enforcement of the Seller Rule must be extensive and
swift.
Presently the consumer's only apparent means of asserting his
defenses when the seller omits the required notice is through the
prescribed FTC enforcement procedures. An analysis of the powers
and problems of the FTC, however, shows that the procedures are
inadequate to serve the purposes of the Seller Rule because they are
too complicated and tenuous to constitute an improvement over direct
suit against the seller. All enforcement by the FTC is discretionary,
selective, and applied as a deterrent for the public good rather than
for the individual good of injured consumers. In addition, the
resources of the FTC are insufficient to permit the Commission to
enforce the Rule thoroughly, even if it desired to do so. Each of these
characteristics of FTC enforcement will be explored. Two other
possible methods of enforcement, which may serve to make the Seller
Rule more effective, will also be examined.
Problems with the Enforcement Process of the FTC
The Federal Trade Commission is neither physically nor
philosophically equipped to enforce the Seller Rule adequately. The
134. The Seller Rule has the important additional benefit of preserving a
cause of action when the seller is unavailable.
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congressionally designated purpose and structure of the FTC are
antithetical to proper enforcement of any law as pervasive as the
Seller Rule. The Commission acts only at its own discretion, and
when it does investigate violations it does so selectively and for the
sole purpose of deterring future violations, not to compensate for past
injury. 135 In addition, the FTC has developed an unfortunate
13 6
reputation for sluggishness.
137
Utilization of any of the FTC's powers, whether rule-making,
investigative 138 or adjudicative, 139 is totally at the discretion of the
Commission itself. The enabling statute for the FTC reads:

135. The FTC Improvement Act did give the FTC authority to seek restitution
for injured parties where the Commission feels it is the proper corrective measure to
prevent future violations. 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (1975). For an analysis of this new power,
see Note, Restitution for Consumer Fraud Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 69 (1975).
136. G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1924); E. Cox, R. FELMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE
CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) (Nader Report).

137. 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq. (1976) Rules and regulations are promulgated under
a general mandate from Congress to restrict the use of unfair and deceptive practices
in commerce. Authority to issue specific rules in furtherance of its mandate given in
Section 5 of the FTCA was validated in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Several years later the FTC
Improvement Act of 1975 granted the specific right to make such rules. Pub. L. No. 93637, 88 Stat. 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1975)). The Seller Rule was initiated
under the claimed authority of Section 5 of the Act, while its adoption was pursuant to
the authority granted in the FTC Improvement Act. See note 130 supra.
138. 16 C.F.R. § 2.1 et seq. (1976).
139. Id. at § 3.1 et seq. Adjudicatory proceedings are initiated when the FTC
issues a complaint to all alleged violators. Adjudication is only one of many means of
enforcement for the FTC. It may simply warn the violator, issue a consent agreement
or initiate informal investigation. Id. at § 2.31 et seq. Adjudication can be stimulated by
requests from any party in the economy or by the FTC itself. Once begun, the
investigation may terminate in a number of ways. First, the file may simply be closed
without reason. Id. at § 2.14(b). Recognition of compliance may be given to end further
action. Finally, the consent order may be accepted. Id. at § 2.31 et seq.
When the Commission determines that there has been a violation and completes
proceedings, the FTC may issue a cease and desist order. Discretion is used in
determining how much time will be given for the violator to cease the practice. Id. at §
3.61. Beyond this, the FTC is powerless without recourse to the courts. However, the
Commission may seek a number of remedies through the courts: "If the Commission
satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is
one which a reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest
or fraudulent, the court may grant relief .... 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (1975). Neither the
FTC nor the parties concerned may seek enforcement or appeal until the original
process is complete and an order issued. The violator's right of review is by way of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which states: "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1966).
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Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that
any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is
using any unfair method of competition or unfair or
deceptive act or practice in commerce, and if it shall
appear to the Commission....

the Commission may at any

time, upon such notice and in such manner as it shall deem
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any report
140
or any order made or issued by it under this section.
This discretion has been justified on the ground that the FTC needs
great freedom to use its expertise most effectively. 41 As a general
principle this is true, if the FTC is to maintain its original purpose
and nature. However, what this means for regulations such as the
Seller Rule is that the FTC need not, and probably will not,
investigate or attempt to enforce the Rule simply because a consumer
is injured by a breach. 142 Since all proceedings are discretionary, the
FTC investigates violations on a basis broader than individual injury;
its basis of action is the general public good. The individual consumer
is of only peripheral concern.
Even with recent revitalization the FTC has retained as its
primary purpose the preservation of the public good. 43 The FTC's
Rules of Practice state: "The Commission acts only in the public
interest and does not initiate investigation or take other action when
the alleged violation of law is merely a matter of private controversy
and does not tend adversely to affect the public."'1 Two pertinent
distinctions can be drawn from the meaning of "in the public
interest." First, the FTC acts as a guide to the commercial interests
in America, not as a guard for the parties foreseeably injured.
Second, the FTC acts for the public good, not for the individual good
of the consumer actually injured. 45 The Commission is not a court in
which injured consumers may seek redress, but is a forum where
trade expertise is employed to infuse general standards of fairness.
The 1966 Annual Report of the FTC noted: "The Commission's
purpose is not to bring an even greater number of adversary actions;
140. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
141. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392-95 (1965); Holloway
v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
142. See Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
143. See generally FTC Improvement Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat.
2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1975)).
144. 16 C.F.R. § 2.3 (1973).
145. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 67 (1971); FTC v. Cinderella Career &
Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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its function is essentially one of guidance.'146 For the consumer this

can only mean that there is no basis for expecting investigation of his
case should the seller violate the Seller Rule. While the Commission
may indeed investigate such violations, there is no guarantee that any
particular consumer's case will be handled. The consumer can only
hope that the seller is a major violator-major enough to provoke
FTC action.
Since the FTC's function is primarily one of guidance, it
enforces regulations on a selective basis and for the purpose of
deterring future actions deemed unfair or deceptive. 147 Enforcement
is not concerned with the particular injury of a consumer but solely
with stopping the violator from repeating his act in the future. If
deterrence can be achieved by forcing violators to compensate the
consumer for his injury, the FTC may order restitution. 148 The theory
of selective enforcement as practiced by the FTC assumes that the
majority of businesses affected by any regulation will follow its
requirements without prodding from the agency. To insure that they
do comply, FTC enforcement resources are used against target
violators who provide examples to others who might consider
violating the regulation. This, it is hoped, provides impetus for the
149
particular industry to police itself.
Many sellers, however, have not policed themselves, as evidenced by the very need for regulations such as the Seller Rule. If the
Rule is to improve the consumer's lot, then it should be enforced
strictly, and not on a selective basis. When enforcement is selective
the individual seller has little fear of being penalized for separating
duties, and the individual consumer has no assurance of relief. The
consumer weighing his chances for relief would be foolish to rely on
the FTC to investigate and remedy his case unless the seller were
totally beyond the court's reach.
The Seller Rule and the Limited Resources of the FTC
Not only are the nature and purpose of the FTC detrimental to
proper enforcement of the Seller Rule in that it cannot be applied
with the requisite regularity and certainty, but the Commission itself
146.

DAVIS, supra note 145, at 69 (emphasis added). See Regina Corp. v. FTC,

322 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1963).
See Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See note 135 supra; Curtis Publishing Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP (CCH) f1 19,719 (1970). See also Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., [197020,345 (1973).
1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
149. STAFF STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE
ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 480 (1975).
147.
148.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1977], Art. 3
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

also lacks the resources to enforce anything except in a selective
manner. 15 Furthermore, the FTC's past record indicates that even
those resources that the Commission does have are often misapplied. 151 Proceedings that are initiated often take years to
complete. 15 2 If the benefits of the Seller Rule are to be maintained
when the Rule is violated, enforcement and remedy must be
completed in time for the consumer to assert his defenses against the
creditor before legal action. The history of FTC adjudication
indicates that it is unlikely that the Commission has the resources
necessary for such efficiency.
There has been a trend to increase the resources of the FTC, but
the trend has not kept pace with the expansion of FTC authority. In
the past five years over eight new areas of regulation have been
opened by FTC, with a corresponding increase in its budget of
only $23 million.', 3 The entire Commission employed only 531
attorneys in 1975; they had the sole responsibility of developing
regulations, investigating all existing regulations, and adjudicating
all violations in the vast area of FTC authority.1M With each new
regulation the FTC promulgates, it spreads itself even thinner.
Indeed, selective enforcement is the only viable method of enforcement available to the FTC.
Those resources which are available to the FTC are often wasted
on inconsequential litigation. In hearings by the Senate Committee
on Commerce during investigation of the FTC, it was found that, "the
Commission has failed to properly utilize the limited resources it has.
... [T]he apparent attitude is that the powers will be used sparingly
and only in carefully selected cases."'155 Two reports were extremely
critical of the Commission's use of its resources. One report, issued by
the American Bar Association, stated: "Our study has led us to the
conclusion that the FTC's efforts to investigate the basis in fact for
this public outcry [against deceptive schemes] and to find ways of
150. FTC Oversight: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1974) (statement of Ann Brown) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
153. See, e.g., "Negative Option Plans," 16 C.F.R. § 425 (1974); "Cooling Off
Period," 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1974). For figures on the budget see BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT (1976).
154. Federal Government Legal Career Opportunities 122 (1976) (government
publication). In 1974 the Commission employed 1600 in all. Hearings,supra note 150,
at 312 (statement of Commissioner Engmon).
155. Hearings, supra note 150, at 283 (statement of George Zervas).
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coping with whatever underlying problems exist have been inadequate.' ' 56 Another highly critical study was published by Ralph
Nader's organization.'5 7 While some of the criticism has died since
the passage of the Alaska Act 158 and the Magnuson-Moss Act, 159
others have continued their attacks on the FTC's performance. 16 °
This combination of limited and misallocated resources has
resulted in extremely protracted investigations. Even if a particular
consumer's injury is selected for investigation, it may be years before
the problem is resolved. The injured consumer also faces the
possibility that the Commission will find that in the public good it
would be better not to seek restitution from the violator. 161 The
consumer injured by violation of the Seller Rule will generally find
these characteristics totally debilitate his rights under the Rule. If
forced to wait for the FTC to investigate and adjudicate, the
consumer would be wiser to pay the creditor and sue the seller, thus
foregoing the protection of the Rule altogether. It is only where the
seller is beyond suit that the consumer would be justified in relying
on the FTC to enforce the Rule; yet by that time state law would
probably require that he pay the creditor.
Because of all these factors, the FTC is not the ideal body to
effectuate the Seller Rule's purpose of preserving consumers' claims
and defenses. Enforcement within the FTC is totally discretionary,
selective, and done for the public good rather than for individual
relief; hence it affords the individual consumer no guarantee of a
remedy when the Rule is violated. The impact of the Seller Rule will
be slight to most consumers unless alternative theories of enforcement can be found.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR ADEQUATE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE SELLER RULE

Perhaps the best solution to enforcing the Seller Rule would be
to recognize a private cause of action in the consumer injured by a
violation. One means of recognition would be to imply a federal cause
156.
157.
158.

ABA COMM'N TO STUDY THE FTC 36 (Sept. 1969).
See note 136 supra.
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 205, 87 Stat. 588 (43
REPORT OF THE

U.S.C. § 1654 (1973)).
159. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
160. See Note, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FederalTrade Commission
Improvement Act: Should the Consumer Rejoice?, 15 J. FAM. L. 77 (1976-77).
161. See Curtis Publishing Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH)
19,719 (1973).
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of action from the Seller Rule through the doctrine of implication. A
second possible means of enforcement would be for the state courts to
hold that knowing acceptance by the transferee of a note or contract
which violates the Seller Rule is bad faith within the meaning of the
U.C.C. Such a ruling would prevent the holder from cutting off the
claims and defenses of the consumer. By asserting a cause of action
under either of these theories, the consumer would be able to claim
the rights guaranteed in the prescribed notice even if it were omitted
from the note or contract. Although both alternatives are limited
remedies, they do supply the speed and ease of adjudication needed
for enforcement of the Seller Rule.
Recognition of a Private Causeof Action-The Doctrine of Implication
One of the possible solutions to the problems involved in FTC
enforcement of the Seller Rule would be to imply a private cause of
action from the Federal Trade Commission Act as clarified in the
Seller Rule. 162 The legal theory under which this would be possible is
the doctrine of implication. This doctrine states that the courts will
imply a cause of action from a federal act, even if such a cause of
64
action is not specifically granted, if certain criteria are met.
Implying a private cause of action has the primary benefit of giving
the consumer the full rights contained in the Seller Rule's notice,
even if the notice is omitted; the principal stumbling-block of the
doctrine is that implication would alter the traditional nature of the
FTC. However, if the Commission is to enter the area of consumer
protection with any force, implication of such private remedies must
be recognized.
In the past the majority rule on implication in cases dealing with
federal regulatory agencies has been that Congressional intent was
clear: enforcement was solely vested in the agency, and thus no
private cause of action would be implied. Such agencies, it has been
argued, are not legislative and should not be used to create
162. FTC rules are actually clarification of what the FTC considers to be a
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 45(aXl): "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Therefore,

the implication of a private cause of action would be based on this broad statement, but
actually recognized through the specific rules such as the Seller Rule. See 15 U.S.C. §
57(aX1XA) and (B) (1975).

163. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
164.

See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); notes 173-74 infraand accompanying

text.
165. Enforcement has been considered as much a part of FTC policy as rulemaking. See United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1966).
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substantive rights in the individual. Until recently, this analysis has
been applied with particular unanimity to claims arising from FTC
66
regulations.

1

In recent years judicial and legislative changes have brought
about an erosion of the hard line against granting private causes of
action where administrative agencies are involved. With increasing
frequency Congress has deferred to the expertise of federal agencies
to act as the regulators and legislators of whole areas of law. 167 Since
it is the agency and not Congress which is the primary actor in a
given field, the pressure to imply private causes of action from
regulations has increased. Some courts have taken the initiative by
recognizing private causes of action. 6 These new cases warrant a
renewed look at private enforcement as a viable alternative to FTC
enforcement of the Seller Rule.
Because of the wording of the Seller Rule, implication of a
private cause of action appears to be a very limited solution to the
problems posed by enforcement solely through the FTC. The Rule
designates the seller as violator. Thus, when the creditor approaches
the consumer seeking payment on a transferred note or contract, the
assertion of a violation of the Seller Rule will be useless against that
creditor-the creditor did not technically violate the Rule.169 Only if
the seller is available and can be joined in the action is the assertion of
a violation feasible. Yet, consideration of the implication of private
remedy remains meritorious for several reasons. First, joinder of the
seller followed by assertion of a violation of the Seller Rule is
superior to the two actions often necessary without the Rule.
Secondly, and more significantly, the FTC has proposed an amendment to the Seller Rule which would place the same duty on the
166. Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974);.
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola
Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); LaSalle St. Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971); Bott v.

Holiday Universal, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff 60,973 (1976).
167. See Cross v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County, 326 F. Supp. 634,
637 (N.D. Cal. 1968), affld, 442 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1971). Cases where private action has
been implied from administrative agency acts include: Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1923); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d
232 (2d Cir. 1974); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d
765 (3d Cir. 1963); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1945).
168. Evans v. Krebs & Co., 411 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Rauch v. United
Instruments, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
169.

Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of Private

Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 274, 281
(1975).
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creditor as presently rests on the seller. 170 If this amendment is
adopted, the implication of a private cause of action would be a
significant benefit. The consumer could then assert such violation
against the creditor and vitiate any waiver of defenses clause or HDC
status the holder may claim.
There are several stages at which a private cause of action could
be implied from the Rule. Broad recognition could be made of the
consumer's right to assert a violation of the Rule for a de novo
determination. Implication could be more restricted, however, and a
cause of action implied only after the Commission had investigated
and designated the seller-creditor a violator. Finally, implication
could be further delayed until the FTC had issued a cease and desist
order which the seller-creditor violated.
To provide the consumer a meaningful alternative to the lengthy
and unlikely enforcement through the FTC, implication should be
broad, permitting courts to make a de novo determination of
violation. While the expertise of the Commission would not be relied
on, it is doubtful such reliance would be necessary. The SellerCreditor Rule makes determination of a violation a relatively simple
investigation. 171
The doctrine of implication states that when a federal act does
not specifically grant a private cause of action, courts may imply the
same under certain conditions. These criteria, expressed in varying
forms since first adopted, were most clearly stated in Cort v. Ash. 172
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Supreme Court of the United
States, explained:
In determining whether a private remedy is implied
in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are
relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for those
especial benefit the statute was enacted"? . .. Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or deny one?... Third, is
it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?... And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the-States, so
170. The text of the Rule reads: "It shall be an unfair or deceptive act for a
seller to .... " 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975) (emphasis added).
171.
172.

See notes 90 and 170 supra.
See notes 164 and 165 supra and accompanying text.
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that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
73
based solely on federal law?
The basis of the Cort test is the congressional intent in passing the
considered act. That intent is analyzed in three of the criteria:
intended persons affected, intent to create or deny private cause of
action, and the action being consistent with the underlying scheme
intended. 174 Once the congressional intent is determined the courts
will apply the four criteria listed in Cort and either imply or reject a
private action.
In recent years there has been a subtle change between the
traditional analysis of congressional intent and analysis of intent
from agency enabling statutes. This recent analysis has looked at
congressional intent with more concern for the deeper intent of
Congress and the needs of the individual. 75 It is this broadening
analysis, more attuned to individual needs, that holds the possibility
for implication of a private cause of action under the Seller Rule.
The first criterion of the Cort test asks whether the petitioner is
a member of the class which Congress intended to protect.
Traditional analysis of this criterion has required that the petitioner
be the primary and directly intended beneficiary of the act. 176 In Cort
v. Ash this analysis was used to deny plaintiffs in a stockholder
derivative suit a cause of action from the Federal Election Campaign
Act, which made it unlawful for the corporation to make political
contributions without stockholder consent. 77 Plaintiffs argued that
the act was to protect stockholders from misuse. The Court noted,
however, that the purpose of the statute was to destroy influence
which corporations may have over elected officials: "ordinary
stockholders [were] at best a secondary concern.' ' 78
In Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc.,' 79 a federal district court
gave the criterion a different and more expansive reading. In Rauch
173. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The doctrine of implication has been
developing since Texas & P. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1915), and has been used in
many cases. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1975); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
174. 422 U.S. at 80-84.
175. See Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind.
1976).
176. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 68, 81 (1975).
177. 18 U.S.C. §610 (1907). See 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1905); United States v. CIO,
335 U.S. 106 (1948).
178. 422 U.S. 68, 81 (1975).
179. 405 F. Supp. 435 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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parties who had been forced by the Federal Aviation Authority
(FAA) to replace an instrument in their planes brought suit under
the FAA order against the manufacturer for the economic loss
incurred in the replacement. While the court recognized that the
purpose of the FAA was to maintain safety in flights and not to
protect the owners of aircraft from economic loss, it permitted the
cause of action. 180 Even though the plaintiffs were not the primary
beneficiaries of the FAA action, and even though the economic loss
was only indirectly encompassed by the FAA order, this court's
analysis determined that the first criterion of the Cort test had been
18
met.
The consumer invoking the Seller Rule would likely meet the
first criterion even under the traditional analysis. However, Rauch
and similar cases 182 indicate a broadening of the scope in which
implication will be allowed. Later cases also show a willingness on
the part of some courts to extend the law by implying a cause of
action where justice requires it-even in the case of administrative
regulations.
While analysis of the second criterion, legislative intent to create
or deny a private cause of action, has remained rather stable, the real
difference between the traditional analysis and the newer analysis
lies in the respective approaches to the third criterion: is implication
of a private cause of action consistent with the underlying purpose of
the legislative scheme? The traditional approach has focused on the
congressional intent for enforcement. On this, the methodological
level, courts ask whether a private cause of action would be contrary
to the enforcement scheme set up by Congress. In Holloway v.
Bristol-Meyers Corp.,8 3 a case in which private action under the
Federal Trade Commission Act was denied, the methodological
purpose analysis was used. The court stated that the method of
enforcing FTC regulations was clearly laid out in the Act. Therefore,
implication of a private cause of action would be contrary to the
underlying scheme. 84
In a case decided nine years before Holloway,8 5 the Supreme
Court adopted an approach which concentrated on the ultimate
purpose of Congress rather than on the enforcement scheme.
180.

Id. at 441-42.

181. Id. at 439.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See notes 167 and 168 supra.
485 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 998.
J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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Implying a private cause of action from a regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 186 the Court stated: "it is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose."'8 7 This was clearly not a
methodological purpose analysis; the analysis concentrated instead
on the "ultimate purpose" of Congress.
The ultimate purpose analysis is a total appraisal of congressional intent. Unlike the methodological analysis which looks no
deeper than to determine whether implication would be within the
expressed methods of enforcement, the ultimate purpose analysis
goes well beyond that point to discern the purpose of the act itself.
The analysis then requires appraisal of stated 'enforcement procedures to determine whether a private action would help or
frustrate the reason for enforcement-that is, the ultimate purpose.
In applying the ultimate purpose analysis, the federal District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana rejected the holding of
Holloway and recognized a private cause of action based on a
violation of a FTC cease and desist order. In Guernsey v. Rich Planof
the Midwest, 8 the court made an objective appraisal of the FTC
enforcement prescribed by the Act and ruled that FTC enforcement
ability was insufficient. If the ultimate purpose of Congress were to
be effectuated, the court held, a private cause of action must be
implied: "In weighing the benefits to the consumer against any
possible damage to the FTC's role in 'providing certainty and
specificity to the broad purpose of the Act,' the court must opt in
favor of the consuming public."' 89 The court held that a private cause
of action had to be implied "[iun order to effectuate the purpose of the
act."

190

The doctrine of implication is a viable solution to the inadequacy
of Seller Rule enforcement by the FTC. The trend among the courts
is toward an ultimate purpose analysis of Congressional intent; courts
have shown a willingness to increase the effectiveness of agency
enforcement for those protected by the regulations. Further, there is
a trend to extend the benefit of such regulations to those only
peripherally concerned.
186. The regulation violated was 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1963).
187. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
188. 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976), noted in Comment, Divestingthe FTC of
Exclusive Enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 U. Pirr. L. REV. 113
(1976). See also Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1973) (Solomon,
C.J., dissenting).
189. 408 F. Supp. at 588.

190. Id.
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Courts which have implied a private action from FTC regulations have done so only in a restricted manner. Even the Guernsey
court made no blanket recognition of a right of private parties to
claim a cause of action. The facts of that case permitted only
recognition of private action to enforce a cease and desist order issued
by the FTC. The Guernsey court was still concerned with the need to
employ the commercial and economic expertise of the Commission in
the enforcement of rules and regulations.19' However, this case does
show the trend toward a broad recognition of private causes of action
from FTC regulations. For the Seller Rule and its proposed Creditor
Rule amendment, the Guernsey court's consumer approach holds real
hope that the courts will consider the ultimate purpose analysis and
imply a broad private right of action. To do less would leave the impact
192
of the Rule severely restricted.
The final criterion of the Cort test requires inquiry into whether
the cause of action claimed by the plaintiff is one that can be
exercised under state law. 93 It is clear that Congress did not intend
to preempt state law by passage by the FTCA. 194 Thus if there is a
solid state law cause of action open to the consumer, courts will be less
likely to imply a federal cause of action. The consumer under the
Seller Rule does have a possible state cause of action which, if
recognized, would reduce the likelihood of implication but would also
reduce the need for such a federal cause of action. If the state cause of
191. One of the major arguments favoring the FTC as the only enforcement
body is the need for expertise in that enforcement. Because this is the reason
enforcement was delegated to the FTC originally, those who oppose private enforcement argue that removing the FTC from the scene would be contrary to the intent of
Congress. However, in Guernsey, the FTC had already acted, designating the
defendant as a violator. The problem remained that the FTC was too preoccupied or
bogged down or unconcerned to enforce the cease and desist order. Since the FTC had
already brought its expertise to bear in the case, the court felt that there was little need
to defer further to that body. But the Guernsey court went further:
To conclude that, without exception the Federal Trade Commission, with
its overview of the national economy, is in a better position than a private
litigant to gauge the injury a deceptive practice will cause to the public
and to balance this against the likely cost of eliminating the practice
would be to seemingly ignore the basic premise of the free enterprise
economy-that consumers should have the opportunity to choose between
competing merchants on the basis of price, quality, and service.
192. However, a recent case in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia has followed the Holloway approach and denied private action. Bott v.
Holiday Universal, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ff 60,973 (1976).
193. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 57b(e) (1975).
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action is not recognized, the need for implication is all the more
pressing.195
Alternative Enforcement in State Law through Reflection

Faced with established precedent denying private enforcement
of an FTC regulation and the restricted nature of that solution even if
recognized, the consumer who has been injured by a violation of the
Seller Rule may seek a cause of action through the Uniform
Commercial Code, a state theory based on statute. Even if the state
does not specifically reject separation of transactional duties to cut off
defenses, 196 the Seller Rule's requirements may reflect on that state
law so as to create a cause of action in the individual consumer-a
claim that would permit him to assert his defenses against the
creditor immediately. This reflection theory of enforcement reasons
that when a seller or creditor fails to place the requisite notice in the
proper credit note or contract, and does so knowingly, he has acted in
bad faith. Having acted in bad faith, he is estopped from cutting off
the personal defenses of the consumer through U.C.C. § 3-302.19
To implement such an enforcement theory the state law must be
able to recognize the indirect effect that violation of the federal law
has on state law; state law requirements must enforce federal law
indirectly. Further, violation of the Seller Rule must be found to be
"bad faith" within the meaning of Articles Three and Nine of the
U.C.C. Neither of the questions are addressed, however, if federal
law totally preempts state law in the area of preservation of
consumer claims and defenses.
Federal preemption of state law may be either explicit or
implicit.198 If Congress expresses an intent to preempt the field, then
the state law in that area is preempted. 199 When Congress does not
expressly preempt, state law may still be preempted if the terms of
the state law conflict with federal law, or if the effect of state law
195. Recently a bill was introduced before the House of Representatives which
would provide that "a civil action may be brought ... by any person, partnership, or
corporation injured by such unfair or deceptive acts or practices." H.R. Res. 1767,95th
Cong., 2d Sess. TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 268 at 6 (Feb. 15, 1977).
196. See notes 29 and 30 supra.
197. Separation through the HDC status of U.C.C. § 3-302 requires the holder
to take in good faith. If the holder fails to take in good faith he is subject to all personal
defenses of the obligor-consumer. See note 33 supra.
198. See Hirsch, Toward a New View of FederalPreemption,1972 U. ILL. L.F.
515.
199. See Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
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either conflicts with or frustrates that of the federal law. 200 Problems
with implied preemption can be avoided if there exists a savings
20 1
clause in the federal law.
Explicit preemption is no obstacle to state law recognition of the
protections granted in the Seller Rule. Congress has made it clear
that once the FTC enters an area of regulation it does not preempt
state law, except where the two are in direct conflict: there is no
explicit preemption. The FTC enabling statute states that consumer
rules are in addition to and not in lieu of state law. 20 2 Acknowledging
that the FTC did not preclude state action, a federal circuit court
stated, "This Act does not purport to affect a consumer's right to
obtain damages in a common law action that may evolve in common
law jurisprudence." ' 203 Clearly the Seller Rule implicitly preempts
U.C.C. §§ 3-302 and 9-206 which grant holder in due course status
whenever consumer transactions are involved. The conflict here is
direct; however, the other requirements of the U.C.C. remain intact.
The extent to which implicit preemption will be avoided where
FTC regulations are concerned was examined at length in DoubleEagle Lubricants, Inc. v. Texas.2°4 A manufacturer of reconditioned motor oil had been ordered by the state to place the words
"Reconditioned Motor Oil" on the front and back panels of all cans of
oil it sold. The FTC meanwhile promulgated a rule which required
manufacturers of such oil to disclose on the front panel that the oil
had been made from previously used oil.205 Petitioners felt that they
should not have to comply with both regulations and thus sought
injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of the state
law. The court permitted both regulations to stand. Silence by
Congress on the issue of preemption was interpreted as rejection of
any intent to preempt explicitly.2 6 The court then gave the rule for
200. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (frustration of purpose);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S. 423
(1966) (clearly implied intent to preempt); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (conflict of purpose).
201. Hirsch, supra note 198, at 538.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 56b(e) (1975). In an advisory opinion dated Oct. 12, 1976 the
FTC stated, "The Commission staff does not believe that the required Notice will
impair a consumer's right to a larger recovery than that set forth in the Notice [other
state actions not preempted]." [1974- Transfer Binder] CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE CCH
1198,284 (1977).
203. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
204. 248 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 360 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1965), dismissed,
384 U.S. 434 (1966).
205. 16 C.F.R. § 406.5(b) (Supp. 1965).
206. 248 F. Supp. at 518.
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determining implied preemption: "Therefore, state laws providing
for regulation of unfair or deceptive practices in commerce are valid
unless they conflict with the federal law to the extent that both cannot
20 7
stand in the same area."
It is clear, then, that only those terms of the U.C.C. that directly
conflict with the Seller Rule are preempted. 20 8 An aggriveved
consumer has a choice of either relying on the FTC to resolve
violation of the Seller Rule, or of resorting to a possible state theory.
The Seller Rule does not explicitly preempt any state law, and
implicitly preempts only that part of the U.C.C. which specifically
permits cutting off consumer defenses; other causes of action are in
force and may be used to create a cause of action even though the
Seller Rule designates the Commission as the enforcer.
Upon violation of a federal law or rule which is not directly
enforceable in a state court, the state court may recognize the
secondary effect that such violation may have on the requirements of
certain state laws.20 9 Such recognition often occurs in a negative
sense, as where state courts must refrain from certain debtorcreditor actions until federal law is enforced through bankruptcy. 210
It has also been recognized by state recidivist laws that federal
prosecutions may be taken into consideration. 211 Under the Seller
Rule, the reflection theory of enforcement requires the state court to
respond positively by enforcing the federal requirement on the basis
of the effect that the federal law has on state law.
In Miller v. American Telephone & Telegraph,212 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted the effect of
federal on state law. Stockholders brought a derivative action
against the corporation with both state and federal claims for failure
to collect a $1.5 million debt from the Democratic National Com207. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).

208. The other tests often applied in cases of preemption-interference and
occupying the field-do not call for preemption to any greater extent than the HDC
status of U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 9-206. See Hirsch, supra note 198, at 526-33.
209. For want of a better term, this enforcement theory will be called
"reflection."
210. Kesler v. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153(1962); Jerry Davidson,
Inc. v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 54 Mich. App. 278, 220 NW.2d 714 (1974).
211. In State v. Jones, 387 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. 1965), the state court permitted
prior federal prosecutions to be considered for recidivist state laws. While this is not a
direct recognition of federal law in the application of state law, it does recognize
federal activity as having sufficient effect on state law so as to alter enforcement of
state law. It does not further a federal purpose, however, as would reflection of the
Seller Rule on state law.
212. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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mittee. The federal counts were based on rules issued by the Federal
Election Commission. Enforcement of these rules had been con213
signed to the FEC, and thus these claims were dismissed. The state
law claims by themselves would have also been dismissed as they
sought judicial review of a business judgment of the directors of a
corporation; this was an area which the state law would not
scrutinize. However, since the directors' decision was itself a
violation of the agency rule, the effect that this had on the state law
was to bring the directors' action under review. Refusing to dismiss
the otherwise invalid state claim, the court stated: "Where, however,
the decision not to collect a debt owed its corporation is itself alleged
to have been an illegal act [according to the FEC regulation],
different rules apply. .... ,,214 This court concluded that the directors'
.... amounted to a
act, "though committed to benefit the corporation
'215
breach of fiduciary duty in New York.
By analogy from Miller, states should recognize the violations of
the Seller Rule as bad faith within the meaning of the U.C.C.,
enforcing the reflexive effect the FTC violation has on the Code
requirements. This, of course, requires finding that it constitutes
bad faith for a creditor or seller to transfer or accept consumer credit
contracts or notes which do not include the Seller Rule notice of
preservation.
According to § 3-302 of the U.C.C., before the transfer of a
negotiable instrument can cut off personal defenses, the transferee or
holder must take in good faith. 216 That term is defined to mean
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. '217 Without
good faith, the holder is not an HDC and the consumer is free to assert
personal defenses against him. Good faith by the transferee is also
required where credit contracts are concerned if a waiver of defenses
clause it to be binding on the consumer. 218 Thus, in all situations
where the Seller Rule applies, except for the interlocking loan
transaction, good faith must exist for the holder of the instrument to
cut off the defenses of the consumer.
213. The Third Circuit refused to imply a private cause of action from the
Congressional Act. See notes 167-68 supra and accompanying text.
214. 507 F.2d at 762.
215. Id. See also Cort v. Ash, 402 U.S. 66 (1975).
216. See note 33 supra.
217. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
218. The Code validates waivers only for the assignee "who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense." U.C.C. §
9-206(1).
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Good faith does not exist where the holder knows the note or
contract is tainted with illegality. 219 It is rare that a debtor raises
illegality as a means of defeating HDC status of a creditor, for the
illegality itself is often a stronger suit such as fraud. 220 In the Seller
Rule context, however, the assertion of the illegality directly is time
consuming and without guarantee. The illegality then may be used to
indicate lack of good faith to preserve the consumer defenses and
221
claims against the holder.
The primary benefit of this reflection theory of enforcement is
that the creditor is directly affected. The Seller Rule requires only
the seller to include or to insure that the notice be included in proper
instruments. Reflection, however, denies the creditor the ability to
sit back and benefit from the seller's violation. The creditor's
knowledge of the need for the notice, which can often be assumed in a
business setting, is sufficient to deny him the ability to cut off the
consumer's defenses. The consumer may assert bad faith directly
against the creditor upon the creditor's petition for payment under the
instrument.
The defectiveness of this enforcement theory is two-fold. First,
it cannot reach the interlocking loan transaction because the creditor
deals directly with the consumer and makes no transfer. The
consumer's only possible relief beyond the FTC process would be
under a fraud theory. The problem with this is that the creditor
cannot really be said to have intended to defraud the consumer except
in those cases where he works closely with the seller in a concerted
effort to work a separation of duties. The second problem posed by
state law enforcement is that it requires the court to make a
determination as to whether the FTC regulation was in fact
violated-a determination which courts have in the past been wont to
avoid in deferrence to the FTC's expertise. Courts also face the
problem of collateral estoppel if the FTC were to adjudicate at the
same time.2 22 Yet, the violation of the Seller Rule is a rather simple
219. Appel v. Morford, 62 Cal. App. 2d 36, 144 P.2d 95 (1943); 11 AM. JUR. 2D,
Bills and Notes § 425 (1963). See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase, supra note 6.
220. But see, Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
221. The creditor must, however, have actual knowledge of the illegality. This
should be fairly easy to prove in the business situation where the creditor may be
presumed to know the legal requirements of his business.
222. For a discussion of possible collateral estoppel effect that agency
proceedings might have in court determinations, see Dawson, Why a Decision by the
NLRB Under 8(b)(4) Should Be Determinative on the Issue of Liability in a Subsequent
Section 303 Damage Suit, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 680 (1974). It must be noted that in the
NLRB context, the Board is required to act, while FTC action is discretionary. Thus, in
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question which could be made with only a minor investigation, or
could be assumed from an earlier FTC determination. Should state
courts recognize this reflection of the Seller Rule into state law, the
consumer's promised protection, preventing cutting off of claims and
defenses, could be realized.
CONCLUSION

The FTC's regulation, "Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses," is one more step in the movement to extract the concept of
the holder in due course from the consumer credit field. Extension of
the Rule's protection beyond the promissory note and the seller credit
transaction to the interlocking loan is a daring and necessary move.
Surely, the FTC has made progress; whether it can achieve
uniformity and clarity in the field is yet to be seen.
The Seller Rule cannot be the final step in consumer credit
protection. Presently the Rule holds too many possible loopholes and
suggests too many detrimental side effects. The scope of the Rule
should be extended to include the creditor as well as the seller. The
fact that the credit card transaction is growing in popularity and
remains as a possible means of separating transactional duties to cut
off defenses demands that this method of consumer buying be closely
monitored in the future to determine whether it will be used by the
disreputable seller to avoid the intent of the Rule. Continuing
analysis of the effect the Rule is having on the cost and availability of
credit must also be made. In that regard, the sociological impact of
the Rule in its division of the lower income consumer from the middle
and upper income consumers, and the simultaneous reduction of the
scope of the Seller Rule, require more consideration in the future.
Furthermore, complete reconsideration should be given to the
use of the FTC as the body from which this type of regulation is
issued. The general nature, the purposes, and the limited resources
of the FTC make it difficult for that body to act as a consumer
agency. It is even more difficult for the FTC to enforce the pervasive
Seller Rule effectively. Any FTC action, however, can be commended if it raises the level of awareness among the states, so as to
spawn parallel protection where such consumer protection can be
more fully realized.
Apart from future development, there are several possible
means by which the consumer may assert his defenses directly even if
the FTC situation, the question arises as to whether conflict between a judicial
determination prior to action by the FTC has a reverse collateral estoppel effect.
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the Seller Rule is violated. Courts may imply a private cause of
action from the Rule, permitting the consumer to assert this right
when the creditor seeks payment. The consumer may also claim that
the creditor or holder, having knowledge of the seller's violation of
the Seller Rule, has acted in bad faith and is estopped from cutting
off the consumer's defenses. This solution it also limited since it does
not speak to the interlocking loan transaction. The ultimate impact
of the Rule and the acceptability of these possible means of
enforcement must await the verdict of future use.
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